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ABSTRACT

A Phenomenological Analysis of Information Security Reporting: A Paradoxical Perspective

BY

Robin Layne Moore
October 2020

Committee Chair: Dr. Lars Mathiassen
Major Academic Unit: Doctor of Business Administration

Current information security research has focused on security threats, prevention of
incidents, and federal regulations for reporting incidents. However, we know little about how the
behavior of information security professionals impacts security. Against this backdrop, this
dissertation seeks to understand the drivers of tensions that information security professionals
encounter in the performance of their job functions, which result in paradoxical tensions while
reporting on the security of organizational assets. The findings of this study reveal how information
security professionals respond to inherent tensions as they become salient, and how these salient
tensions often become paradoxical in nature as they are dealt with as part of a security
professional’s everyday lived experience. The findings highlight the actions undertaken by
security professionals to resolve these paradoxical tensions and, in doing so, often engage in
deviant behaviors that are contrary to organizational policy and industry or governmental
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regulations. These findings thus allow for an improved understanding of the motivations of an
individual and assist with the creation of policies and management oversight activities that are
intended to reduce the likelihood of information security professionals becoming insider threats to
their organizations. To that end, an analytical framing combining paradox theory and deterrence
theory as complementary theoretical lenses was adopted in this study. Following an interpretive
phenomenological analysis methodology, a series of three in-depth interviews, each with eight
information security professionals, was conducted. This methodological approach helped the
participants to reflect on the drivers of tensions that they perceived as part of their lived
experiences. The participants were selected from a range of industries and across a wide spectrum
of experiences to capture a broad diversity of lived experiences. Hence, by determining how the
drivers of tensions lead to paradoxical tensions that impact or guide the motivations and behaviors
of information security professionals responsible for security reporting, the study seeks to
contribute to behavioral information security knowledge in the areas of improvement of
information security compliance, separation of insider deviant behavior from insider misbehavior,
and understanding insider deviant behavior under duress.

Index Terms: Paradox Theory, Neutralization Techniques, Insider Threat, Deviant Behavior,
Deviant Behavior Under Duress, Deterrence Theory, Drivers of Tension, Behavioral
Information Security, Behavioral InfoSec, Insider Deviant Behavior, Insider Misbehavior,
Paradoxical Tensions, Security Professional, Information Security
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INTRODUCTION

Information security reporting is important to most organizations. It covers a wide range
of security areas such as network security, physical security, vendor risk management, application
security, and penetration testing, to name a few. Information security professionals are responsible
for ensuring that organizational users comply with security requirements, gather and secure
information, investigate and help to recover from security incidents, configure and manage
security equipment, and design and monitor security controls, along with many other
responsibilities (Lee et al., 2010). The current study focuses on those information security
professionals who are responsible for generating information security reports. Information security
reports, which can be internal or external to an organization, are produced by information security
professionals who are either internal or external to an organization as members of security teams.
Both teams are insiders with privileged access to data and assets within the security perimeter of
an organization. Information security professionals who are external to an organization are
typically members of teams that are hired to perform a service for the organization, for a limited
time, and for specific reasons such as scanning software for vulnerabilities or probing a network
for security breaches. By contrast, internal security teams engage in the regular and ongoing
security reporting for the organization. These external security professionals, who normally serve
as external auditors, are privy to security information that is not released to anyone except the
organization (Blakley, et al., 2001). These external security reports contain information that is
pertinent to vulnerabilities or weaknesses within an organization; hence, the impact on the
organization is often greater than reports created by internal teams. Current research on
information security reporting is focused on the reporting requirements for incidents that are
detected (Ahmad, et al, 2015; Tøndel, et al., 2014; Wiant, 2005), whereas security reporting to
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prevent incidents has been largely ignored. This gap in research on information security reporting
by information security professionals is the main focus of this study.
Information security professionals perform duties requiring them to be cautious by nature
as they work to protect the information within an organization. Such abundance of caution reduces
their likelihood of engaging with researchers seeking to improve the understanding of the
behaviors of these professionals. The main researcher in this study is an embedded information
security professional with over a decade of experience in the information security field covering
several security reporting areas, including physical security, vendor risk management, application
security, network security, and static code analysis. In addition to the researcher’s experience in
the information security field, the researcher also has several years of experience as a director on
the board of a well-known information security professional association. This experience and
leadership in the information security field served to gain access to the information security
professionals who are less likely to speak to a researcher who is not embedded in the information
security industry. Having a shared experience and knowledge of the field allowed for the
recruitment of study participants and for them to provide the details of their experiences in
information security reporting to which most researchers would not have had access.
The importance of information security reporting cannot be understated with the
information from security reports being used by organizations to determine what and where the
security issues are in order to allocate resources for mitigating these security issues. Security
reporting is often an automated process, but a human element must always be present. The reason
is that automated security reports do not account for mitigating security controls that may reduce
or eliminate a security issue, or false positives that are security issues that are reporting incorrectly
and must be manually reviewed and removed from the final security report. However, these
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information security reports are often manipulated before the final report is presented to the
organization’s executives. The reasons why these information security professionals alter or
manipulate the reports include unethical security cultures, fear of management’s reaction to the
report results, tight deadlines or poorly scoped engagements, lack of experience, team politics, and
coercion by management. The main researcher of this study first learned of information security
reports being manipulated by information security professionals during his career in the
information security field. This factor was the impetus for undertaking this study to enhance the
understanding of the motivations that result in the manipulation of the information security reports.
Furthermore, the tensions and the behaviors that information security reporting induces are
addressed in this study.
Answering a call for the future direction of behavioral information security research in the
areas of the improvement of information security compliance and the separation of insider deviant
behavior from insider misbehavior (Crossler et al., 2013), the present study contributes to both
areas of concern by conducting a phenomenological analysis of information security professionals
with experience in security reporting. As previously stated, information security professionals have
an important role in an organization’s security, and they are privy to insider knowledge such as
vulnerabilities and weaknesses in security. Access to this information places them in a position to
be able to cause considerably more damage than a non-security user inside the organization.
However, these information security professionals must deal with and overcome the same issues
as the non-security users against whom they defend. As the non-security users within an
organization can commit non-malicious mistakes or perform deviant acts leading to security
incidents, information security professionals can similarly do so. Everyday tensions such as work–
life balance, arguments with a coworker or a spouse, fear of management, or disagreements with
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a supervisor that engender mistakes or deviant behaviors are not limited to non-security
professionals. These tensions must be resolved; however, in resolving those tensions, new ones
emerge (Lewis, 2000). In dealing with these tensions, the motivations of individuals lead to their
behaviors. To study these tensions and how information security professionals resolve them, we
employ paradox theory to provide a paradoxical perspective of information security reporting by
security professionals. Paradox theory considers interdependent elements that simultaneously
support and oppose each other (Faems & Filatotchev, 2018). These elements are inherent in life
and manifest as competing tensions that individuals navigate daily with little or no conscious
effort. However, these competing tensions guide the actions and perceptions of how individuals
behave. This study shows how these paradoxical tensions guide the actions of information security
professionals who are responsible for information security reporting.
To understand the lived experiences of information security professionals and the meanings
developed from these complex interactions as they engage in the act of security reporting, a multicase study was conducted, which allowed for deep and meaningful insights to be drawn from the
analysis of the contradictory nature of the paradoxical tensions that information security
professionals encounter when generating information security reports (Eisenhardt, 1998). Dealing
with tensions is a part of everyone’s life. Such tensions are rarely given much thought; instead they
are filed away in our memories as common occurrences. The uncovering of these tensions and
reflecting on them in a manner that guides a study participant to engage in meaning making require
more than one conversation. As such, a series of three in-depth interviews was conducted and
evaluated using an interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA) methodology. Phenomenological
analysis is designed to understand the complex meanings that individuals develop by reflecting on
their lived experiences (Alase, 2017). The current study consists of eight participants, each a
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unique case as each has a different perspective on their lived experiences. By analyzing these eight
cases using an interpretive phenomenological analysis method, we are able to discover the gestalt
of tensions encountered by information security professionals in security reporting activities.
The research design summary is provided in Figure 1. The remainder of the study is
organized into several chapters. Chapter I covers behavioral information security and the two main
areas to which this study is expected to contribute. Chapter II includes paradox theory and
complementary theories. Chapter III provides details into the research methodology used for this
study. Chapter IV outlines the results that the study generated. Finally, Chapter V concludes the
paper; it covers a discussion of the results, contributions to practice and theory, limitations of the
study, and suggestions for future research.
Figure 1
Research Design Summary – Adapted from Mathiassen (2017)
Component

P

A

Definition

The problem setting represents
people’s concerns in a real-world
problematic situation.

The area of concern represents a
body of knowledge within the
literature that relates to the
problem setting.

Details
Information security professionals
responsible for security reporting play an
important role in the security of an
organization while facing the same tensions
as non-security users. In managing these
tensions, security professionals develop a
sense of meaning that leads to their
motivations and behaviors. These tensions
often create new tensions as they are
resolved, making them difficult to manage
and increasing the likelihood that they will
result in insider deviant behaviors.
Information security reporting has been
empirically studied with regard to incident
handling and governmental regulations.
However, little research has been conducted
to investigate the motivations and behaviors
of information security professionals who are
responsible for generating the information
security reports on which organizations rely.
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F

M

RQ

C

The conceptual framing helps to
structure the analysis of data to
answer the research question. FA
draws upon concepts from the
areas of concern, whereas FI is
independent of area of concern.

The adopted methods of
empirical inquiry.

The research question relates to
the problem setting; it opens the
research into the area of concern
and helps to ensure that the
research design is coherent and
consistent.

The contributions to the
problem setting and area of
concern and possibly to
conceptual framework and
method.

Both paradox theory and attribution theory
are used in this study, and this combination
constitutes the conceptual framing of the
area of concern.
Using a multi-case study format that
employs both literal and theoretical
replication logic, this study adopts an
interpretive phenomenological approach to
analyze the meanings that the participants
develop from reflecting on their lived
experiences in security reporting.
A series of three interviews was developed to
guide each participant in the reflection
process.
Each interview was designed to bracket the
field of inquiry to the specific area of
interest, that is, information security
reporting.
How do paradoxical tensions impact or guide
the motivations and behaviors of information
security professionals who are responsible
for security reporting?

This study is expected to contribute to
behavioral information security knowledge
as follows:
• Improving information security
compliance by demonstrating the
behaviors in which information security
professionals engage
• Increasing the body of knowledge in the
area of paradox theory by demonstrating
the paradoxical tensions that information
security professionals encounter, which
affect security reporting
• Distinguishing insider deviant behavior
from insider misbehavior to include the
conceptualization of a new neutralization
technique used by security professionals
who engage in deviant behavior under
duress
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BEHAVIORAL INFORMATION SECURITY
In the insider threat report issued by the Cybersecurity Insiders in 2020, 68% of
organizations indicated that they are vulnerable to insider attacks and 63% of organizations
consider privileged IT users as their greatest insider security risk (Cybersecurity Insiders, 2019).
Understanding the motivations of these insider threats is the focus of behavioral information
security. The extant research largely focuses on the technical challenges to information security
(Crossler et al., 2013), whereas studies on behavioral information security emphasize the
understanding of the individuals’ behavior as it relates to information security. In their paper
Future directions for behavioral information security research, Crossler et al. (2013) calls for
researchers to explore four areas of behavioral information security, namely cross-cultural
behavioral issues, data collection and measurement issues, improvement of information security
compliance, and separation of insider deviant behavior from insider misbehavior. Much of the
literature focuses on insiders as the average user of technology who either have or had a legitimate
right to access organizational resources (Elifoglu et al., 2018). The current study focuses on the
last two of these areas, with emphasis on information security professionals as insiders.
I.1

Improving Information Security Compliance
Behavioral approaches that seek to understand and motivate compliance in information

systems are drawn from criminology and psychology to include neutralization techniques,
protection motivation theory, and deterrence Theory (Vance et al., 2012). Deterrence theory
employs the usage of sanctions to motivate an individual to avoid deviant behavior through the
use of fear of those sanctions (Siponen et al., 2010; Straub, 1990; Workman & Gathegi, 2007). To
ensure that sanctions are effective, the organization must clarify to the personnel that the detection
of their non-compliance will prompt the quick and severe application of the sanctions (Siponen et
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al., 2010). As it relates to information security, an example of a sanction is the potential for
administrative actions up to and including termination for non-compliance with a security policy.
The central tenet of deterrence theory is that an individual will avoid deviant behavior to avert the
potential punishment; furthermore, it is predicated on two components, namely the sanction or
penalty and the likelihood of being caught (Straub, 1990).
Despite the use of deterrence theory to employ sanctions in the development and
deployment of information security polices, deviant non-compliance is still an issue with personnel
employing other techniques to avoid or rationalize their non-compliance with security policies
(Siponen & Vance, 2010). Neutralization techniques were first developed by Sykes and Matza in
1957 to explain the ability of individuals to rationalize their deviant behavior. Sykes and Matza
outlined five major types of neutralization techniques employed by individuals to rationalize their
behavior, namely “denial of responsibility”, “denial of injury”, “denial of the victim”,
“condemnation of the condemners”, and “appeal to higher loyalties” (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Two
new major types were later added to the original five. The first new type emerged 17 years after
Sykes and Matza’s original five, as Carl Klockars added the “metaphor of the ledger” in his book
The Professional Fence (Klockars, 1975). The final major type was added seven years following
that of Klockars when W. William Minor included the “defense of necessity” in the list of
neutralization techniques (Minor, 1981). We will not expand on the entire list of neutralization
techniques because they only serve to highlight the argument that the use of deterrents or sanctions
is insufficient to motivate individuals to avoid deviant behavior in compliance with information
security policies. However, we will highlight the newest neutralization technique to be added to
the list because it is important to the separation of insider deviant behavior from insider
misbehavior. The defense of necessity is employed when individuals perceive their actions as
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necessary even when the act is considered deviant or morally wrong (Minor, 1981). Furthermore,
the defense of necessity is often employed in minor ways such as justifying the act of speeding
because a person is running late. By employing this neutralization technique, individuals can
release themselves from feeling guilty of the deviant behavior by justifying it as necessary to avoid
the harsher punishment for being late. Notably, all seven neutralization techniques are employed
as internal rationalizations to justify deviant behaviors, and they are applicable to both insider
deviant behavior and insider misbehavior.
I.2

Distinguishing Insider Deviant Behavior from Insider Misbehavior
The separation of insiders who act in a deviant manner from those who misbehave is a

matter of intent by the individual, whereby those who overtly commit to non-compliance such as
accessing data or intentionally planting malware are different from the ones who write their
passwords on a sticky note and leave it on their desk (Crossler et al., 2013). Insider deviant
behavior is understood to be intentional in nature, and it typically involves some benefit such as
the monetary gain for selling proprietary secrets or sabotaging organizational systems or data as a
form of hacktivism. This insider deviant behavior is likely to cause repercussions on the
organization, such as reputational damage due to breach notification requirements or the loss of
market share to competitors from the release of intellectual property (Crossler et al., 2013). Insider
misbehavior may still have a significant impact on the organization; however, the intent is not to
inflict harm, as is the case with insider deviant behavior. An example of this situation may be the
accidental setting of a “public” flag on an Amazon S3 bucket containing non-public information,
resulting in the data being accessible to anyone outside of the organization. Although
unintentional, this misbehavior may result in a data breach similar to the one caused by the
deliberate actions of an insider intending to harm the organization. Insider misbehavior typically
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causes a weakness in organizational security, thereby allowing for another actor to exploit this
weakness though not directly committed by the insider (Crossler et al., 2013).
As their role relates to information security reporting, information security professionals
often experience many justifiable reasons for altering an information security report, which would
not qualify as a deviant behavior. For instance, information security professionals may be ordered
by their manager to alter a security report to reduce a security finding because it is a false positive
so as not to create false findings in the report, or because a mitigating control is in place. However,
when ordered to act in a deviant manner, these professionals are faced with two competing
requirements. They must either do what they have been ordered to do by their manager or comply
with the organizational security policy requirements. The war between these two requirements is
a latent tension and in being forced to directly deal with this latent tension, it becomes salient and
requires a resolution be sought; to the individuals, they perceive themselves as not having a good
option. The security policy may state that altering a report in a deviant manner is grounds for
termination, whereas not doing so may also result in the potential threat of reprisal from the
manager who gave the order. This study views this type of situation as a paradoxical tension. In
the next section, paradox theory along with complementary theories are explored.
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PARADOX THEORY
II.1

Paradox Theory
According to Marianne Lewis (2000), paradoxes consist of three characteristics. Paradoxes

may constitute a contradictory yet interrelated perspective, feeling, demand or practice, and they
are created by actors as they make sense of the intricate and changing world by simplifying the
perceived reality into an either/or distinction that simplifies the complex world of reality;
furthermore, paradoxes are realized through self-reflection, often simultaneously revealing the
absurd and irrational existence of opposites (Lewis, 2000). Paradoxical tensions represent a
defining characteristic of a paradox, which may be self-referential loops, mixed messages, and
system contradictions (Lewis, 2000; Putnam, 1986). Additionally, paradoxical tensions persist
over time, forcing a reflection back on the tensions as they are resolved and thus developing into
entirely new tensions that must again be addressed. This process of resolving and creating new
tensions causes difficulty in effectively dealing with the tensions (Lewis, 2000; Putnam et al.,
2016). Groups such as information security teams are inherently paradoxical, as individuals
experience and make sense of the contradictory actions, rules, and instructions that coexist within
the group (Smith & Berg, 1997). As individuals define themselves within a group, they create
boundaries that delineate their self and the group or team; additionally, they demarcate the
boundaries between the group and outside groups such as a group of information security
professionals and non-security users creating systems that are inherently paradoxical (Smith &
Lewis, 2011). These inherently paradoxical groups or systems create paradoxical tensions.
Putnam et al. (2016) define tensions as “stress, anxiety, discomfort, or tightness in making
choices and moving forward in organizational situations” (Putnam et al., 2016, p. 68). Tensions
are latent at first, being dormant or ignored, but become salient in specific situations as they
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manifest in particular ways, becoming observable and triggering actors to respond (Smith & Lewis,
2011). Relating these tensions to information security professionals as they engage in security
reporting, they deal with stress such as unethical instructions, unethical security culture within the
organization, tight deadlines, ambiguous instructions, a demanding boss, team politics, and even
coercion by management. Such tensions are latent until some action or event forces the information
security professional to focus on them, bringing them to salience. Some examples of latent tensions
becoming salient for an information security professional include discomfort in making decisions
due to conflicting demands given by a manager, a lack of skills, and a superior’s demand for
actions that are deviant in nature, such as making an individual perform deviant acts that they
would not otherwise perform through the use of fear, coercion, or force. How individuals deal with
these salient tensions is guided by their perceptions, behaviors, and actions (Ajzen, 1991). Hence,
tensions may be responded to in several different ways such as splitting, projecting, repressing, or
withdrawal. When the response is splitting, an individual chooses one pole of a tension over the
other, further polarizing the contradictions and possibly creating subgroups or social divides
(Lewis, 2000). These subgroups subsequently form a we–them distinction such as a group of
information security professionals who are told to alter a security report for it to show what
management wants it to show, but this group distances itself from the management group as a
means of bringing attention to the tension between the two groups (Smith & Berg, 1997). This
type of response neither eliminates or resolves the tensions nor overcomes the underlying issue of
false reporting to the organization. Projecting is a response whereby a third party is engaged, such
as shifting responsibility for the tension to the human resources (HR) department (Putnam et al,
2016) or projecting the blame onto management (Lewis, 2000). This type of response can engage
other actors to aid in resolving the tension, such as the HR department making changes to policy
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or practices that resolve the tension. However, those same actors may also increase the tension,
such as management deciding not to take any action. Using the example of the information security
team being ordered to generate false reports, if the management were made aware of the issue but
took no action, then the tension felt by the team members might intensify because they see no
alternatives. Repression is a response of denial whereby an individual denies the existence of the
paradoxical tension and any subsequent tensions (Jarzabkowski & Lê, 2016). This response may
be an information security professional denying involvement in any wrongdoing such as the
generation of a false security report. This response may be in conjunction with acts of projecting,
such as denying responsibility and projecting all the blame on the management who ordered the
report to be falsified. Another example would be information security professionals denying any
part in a deviant behavior because they acted under duress, such as a manager ordering them to
commit some insider deviant act or face termination if they refuse to comply. The fear of
termination is a duress condition in which the individual may fear the termination more than
committing the insider deviant act itself. An individual may also respond by withdrawing from the
salient tension, such as seeking other employment (Putnam et al., 2016). If other responses have
failed to resolve the tension or potentially intensified the tension, the response may be to withdraw
from it. If an information security team who has been given instructions to alter security reports
and has attempted to resolve the tension by speaking to management, yet no resolution was
generated, then the team members may elect to seek other employment. This response resolves the
salient tension for the individuals as they remove themselves from the organization, but it does not
resolve the underlying latent tension for the organization that will continue to generate false
security reports.
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By guiding the participant in the reflection on such paradoxical situations, the study was
able to uncover the absurd and irrational opposites as they are perceived by individuals and the
way they have simplified the complex world into straightforward, clearly defined either–or
constructs (Lewis, 2000; Lewis & Smith, 2014; Schad et al., 2016). The present study focuses on
understanding these tensions and the related behaviors through the lenses of the three
characteristics of a paradox as defined by Lewis (2000).
An additional important aspect pertains to what tensions are not. Paradoxical research has
used many terms to relate to the tensions inherent in paradox theory. These terms include dualism,
duality, contradictions, and dialectics. Dualism typically has a clear contrast with well-defined
boundaries that neither overlap nor share a middle ground (Farjoun, 2010). Dualities exist within
a whole, but they occur as opposites that create disagreement with the external boundary creating
synergy within the whole (Smith & Lewis, 2011). Contradictions are mutually exclusive and
interdependent bipolar opposites that may define or even negate each other (Putnam et al., 2016).
Finally, dialectics are opposite but interdependent forces that act on each other, constantly sharing
the roles of thesis and antithesis as they interact with each other (Putnam et al., 2016; Smith &
Lewis, 2011).
Paradoxes have been widely studied in many fields and over several decades. Popular
topics for paradoxical studies include organizational paradoxes such as digital technology renewal
or transformation (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Wimelius et al., 2020), innovation and reform in
telehealth (Cho et al., 2009; Singh et al., 2010; Tracy et al., 2008), stability and innovation
(Farjoun, 2010; Tilson et al., 2012), and institutional change (Ford & Ford, 1994; Seo & Creed,
2002). Other studies on paradoxes analyze individuals such as senior leaders’ dynamic decision
making (Calabretta et al., 2016; Denison et al., 1995; Smith, 2014) and leadership resistance to
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change (Ford, et al., 2008; Kan & Parry, 2004). Despite the amount of excellent studies on
paradoxes at both the organizational and individual levels, research in the realm of information
security professionals remains scant. Given the importance and role of information security
professionals in the security of organizations, I thus focus the research on these individuals to
increase the understanding of the paradoxical tensions they face and, in doing so, expand the
academic knowledge in the area of paradoxical research.
II.2

Complementary theory
Attribution theory explains an individual’s perceived relationship between the cause and

the outcome of an issue, with issues being either internal or external to the individual (Munton et
al., 1999; Park et al., 2008). External attribution assigns causality to factors such as situations or
actors, whereas internal attribution ascribes causation that is internal to the individual; furthermore,
how individuals perceive these internal and external attributes affect their behavior (Park et al.,
2008).
Using attribution theory as the theoretical background, the mum effect explains that an
individual’s desire to report bad news is influenced by two factors, namely fault responsibility and
time urgency (Park et al., 2008). Fault responsibility is the impact that the fear of being responsible
for an undesirable outcome will have on the individual’s desire to report. The less the individuals
perceives themselves as responsible, the more likely they are to report; meanwhile, the inverse is
true: the more they perceive themselves as responsible, the less likely they are to report (Park et
al., 2008). This aspect is an important complementary factor to paradoxical tensions in that the
more responsible the individuals perceive themselves responsible for an outcome, the greater the
tension will be perceived. As it relates to information security professionals, the perception of
responsibility is due to the belief in management holding them responsible for the results of a
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security report. Through management’s attribution of accountability to information security
professionals, the latter perceive an inheritance of responsibility. The time urgency factor again
affects the behavior of individuals as they perceive the relative time before an action has
consequences; that is, the less time individuals have, the more likely they are to report and
inversely, the more time they have, the less likely they are to report (Park et al., 2008). With regard
to paradoxical tensions, as an individual perceives the relative amount of time before actions will
have consequences, the less strength one tension will have over another; furthermore, as the time
moves closer to the potential consequences, the stronger the tensions will act on the individual.

27

METHODOLOGY

Interpretive research helps to increase the understanding of the thoughts and meanings that
individuals give to their lived experiences by producing profound insights; meanwhile,
phenomenology provides the researcher with the ability to see into the world of the study
participants as they experienced it (Klein & Myers, 1999). Phenomenology consists of two main
branches, namely the interpretive, also known as hermeneutic, and the descriptive (Jackson et al.,
2018). Both methods seek to understand the lived experiences of the participants; however,
interpretive phenomenology assumes that the individuals under study have assigned meaning to
their lived experiences through artifacts such as language, consciousness, and other social
constructs, and it seeks to understand how the participants have assigned meaning to those lived
experiences (Boland 1985, 1991; Klein & Myers, 1999; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991).
The current study uses a series of in-depth interviews with eight participants, each of whom
is interviewed thrice, thus forming eight individual case studies. The aim of this study is to explain
how paradoxical tensions affect the security reporting of information security professionals; hence,
the use of a case study methodology is the appropriate vehicle (Yin, 2018, p. 3).
The remainder of this chapter is structured into several sections. First, the case study design
is explained in the first section; this section also presents the rationale for employing a multi-case
design and for using the replication logic in the selection of participants. The data collection is
outlined in the next section; this section also provides an explanation of the purpose of the threeinterview format and the type and structure of the interviews, along with samples of the interview
questions. Finally, the third section concludes with the evaluation of the data, covering the use of
the interpretive phenomenological analysis as well as the process utilized for developing the results
of the study.
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III.1

Multi-case Study
An interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA) methodology was used in this study to

understand the complex meanings that participants have developed from reflecting on their own
lived experiences (Alase, 2017). The information security professional represented the unit of
analysis for the present study; the purpose of the analysis is to comprehend the individuals’
meanings developed after reflecting on their role as it relates to security reporting. All the
participants are employed in an information security role, and they had one or more previous
experiences in an information security role at another organization prior to their current role. This
factor provided a homogenous pool of experience to draw from, thus allowing for an improved
understanding of their lived experiences (Alase, 2017). Eight participants were selected, all of
whom have a similar professional experience, hence allowing for the capture of the commonality
of their experience or phenomenon (Alase, 2017; Polkinghorne, 1989). To obtain a diverse range
of experiences, a two by two matrix was developed using gender and years of experience as
variables (see Figure 2).
Figure 2
Matrix of the Study Participants

Male Security Professionals
≤ 3 Years

Female Security Professionals
≥ 6 Years

Male Security Professionals
≥ 6 Years

Female Security Professionals
≤ 3 Years

The lower experience level is categorized as being at or below three years in a security role. The
level of experience includes the accumulated time in any combination of security roles that may
have been held regardless of security domain or industry. The upper level of experience is
categorized as equal to or greater than six years of experience, and it includes the combined total
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years of experience held regardless of the security role, the level of leadership in the organization,
and the industry. The participants with more experience are expected to also have had more
positions of authority or leadership, such as managers, directors, or higher, as well as more
professional certifications that typically require a higher number of years of experience before
being conferred. An example of one such certification requiring advanced knowledge of security
and experience is the Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) certification,
which obligates a holder to have a minimum of five years of experience in two different security
domains before they can be awarded the certification. Participants with a few years of experience
are expected to hold more individual contributor roles and have fewer professional certifications,
as they have not yet met the requirements for more advanced security certifications. Women are
an underrepresented group in the information security field; in fact, they constitute only 24% of
the industry and continue to earn less than their male counterparts, according to A Cybersecurity
Workforce Report on Women in Cybersecurity (isc2.org, 2020). Women in an information security
role are expected to experience the tensions that their male counterparts would not experience as
they engage in their roles. By selecting only those participants who are engaged in information
security reporting, I used a literal replication to gather their similar experiences. Furthermore, by
choosing different levels of experience and genders, I employed a theoretical replication to gather
contradictory experiences between the two variables of experience and gender. This combination
of literal and theoretical replications generated a sample of eight participants, each of whom was
interviewed thrice times, thus creating 24 interviews.
All the participants were recruited from the Southwest region of the United States using
recruitment emails sent from a professional association for information systems security
professionals, of which the main researcher has a seat on the board of directors. In addition to
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emails sent by the professional association, recruitment emails were also distributed to a list of
contacts generated by the main researcher through years of experience in the information security
field. The participants were not made aware of the researcher’s role in the association’s board of
directors; nonetheless, this information may have been known to the participants through
interaction with the association. The respondents were screened using a basic set of demographic
questions to determine their eligibility for the study. The demographic questions included gender
and years of experience in information security roles, which corresponded to the two variables
mentioned earlier. Upon the determination of the participants’ eligibility to take part in the study,
they were asked about their ability to meet the interview schedule outlined in the interview protocol
section. Those respondents who were neither willing nor able to commit to the interview protocol
schedule were dropped from the list of study candidates. Upon the identification of the eligible
participants, interview sessions were scheduled, and their interview sessions were initiated. This
scheduling method was expected to create an overlap in interview sessions in which no particular
group of participants was being interviewed at any one point during the interview. The study
approach was selected for its theoretical replication, which seeks anticipated results related to all
the participants’ lived experiences related to their involvement in security reporting and the
meaning they draw from the reflection on past and current experiences (Yin, 2018, p. 54). The
number of participants was chosen for their homogeneity and ability to provide a rich and deeply
analytical data set; additionally, such approach conforms to a phenomenological research tradition
of using a participant pool size of less than 25 participants (Alase, 2017) while still allowing for a
comparative analysis of the participants’ experiences (Van de Ven, 2013). The combined total
years of experience for all the participants was 46.5 years, with the lower level of experience
averaging 2.63 years and the upper level of experience averaging nine years. The total combined
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years of experience for males was 28.5 years, with the lower level of experience averaging 2.25
years and the upper level averaging 12 years of experience. The combined total years of experience
for all the female participants was 12 years, with the lower level averaging three years and the
upper level averaging six years of experience. The male: female ratio of experience was females
accounting for 42.11% and males accounting for 57.89%. The average experience between male
and female participants in the lower experience level was evenly distributed, with females
accounting for 57.14% of the experience and males constituting the remaining 42.86%. In the
upper levels of experience, the male participants accounted for 66.67% and females only 33.33%
of the experience. This result was expected, as the percentage of female information security
professionals in the field is currently 24%; this proportion has been growing over the years and as
it increases, females are expected to boost their experience. Although education was not used as a
variable for this study, 50% of the participants have a master’s degree, 37.5% a bachelor’s degree,
and 12.5% a high school diploma. The participants have a large number of certifications; hence,
unexpectedly, the average number of certifications held by participants between the two
experience levels was fairly even, with the higher level of experience having on average 2.75
professional certifications each, whereas the participants with a lower level of experience held on
average 2.0 professional certifications each.
III.2

Data Collection
Human experiences are transitory by nature and in need of reflection if people are to

develop meaning from such experiences. A single interview would not provide participants with
sufficient time to reflect on their experiences in meaningful ways. To overcome this limitation in
reflection, we rely on Seidman’s three-interview series (Seidman, 2013, p. 16).
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Finding meaning in lived experiences is not a novel concept. Individuals are constantly
finding meaning or significance in their lived experiences; however, drawing significance from
these experiences is intuitive, and this process does not occur until people use language to deepen
and transform these experiences that hitherto remain unexpanded and unrefined because they are
stored as everyday occurrences (Merleau-Ponty & Landes, 2012). To reiterate, drawing meaning
from experiences is intuitive, and this case is true whether in fiction or in real life. An example
would be watching a movie of fiction in which a character loses a loved one or a pet. As the
character experiences the anguish of the loss, the viewers begin to draw meaning from the
character’s experience. The viewers may possibly recall similarities to their own lived experiences
and thus derive meaning from the very experience of watching the movie, which upon reflection
can be analyzed and pondered. This reflection is the root of phenomenology, and interpretive
phenomenological analysis seeks to understand the uniqueness of the meaning given to the
experience upon reflection on the experience.
The purpose of this study seeks to understand the particular phenomenon experienced in
the workplace by information security professionals from a paradoxical perspective and these
experiences are not likely to stand out as monumental as say the birth of a child; thus, an approach
was adopted to guide study participants in the reflection process. The approach was based on an
in-depth interviewing methodology from the traditions of phenomenological research used to draw
meaning from lived experiences (Alase, 2017). This is achieved by having participants draw
meaning from interactions in their daily lives (van Manen, 2014). Increasing the understanding of
the participants’ behaviors and the meanings derived from their experiences entails their
participation in a series of three interviews. Each interview was designed to reflect on the
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experiences that the participant has had in dealing with information security reporting and the
meanings developed from those experiences (Seidman, 2013, p. 14).
III.3

Interview Protocol
To facilitate the participants’ active reflection on their lived experiences, each one was

interviewed thrice. This approach was designed to allow the participants to reflect on the questions
asked in each of the first two interview sessions, leading to the third interview in which the
meanings of the experiences discussed in the first two interviews were uncovered. All the interview
sessions were audio-recorded with the consent of each participant for transcription and coding
during the analysis process. The audio recordings and any notes taken by the researcher during the
session were used for generating specific questions tailored from the experiences described in the
first two interview sessions for the final interview as a means of guiding the participants in the
meaning-making process.
The initial interview was the basis for reflection, and it focused on the participants’ past
experiences and their roles prior to their current one. A semi-structured format was adopted for the
interview questions. Moreover, several rules specific to each interview session were followed,
such as an imposed time limit of 90 minutes, and those rules were emphasized during the
recruitment phase and again at the beginning of each interview session. The average duration of
the first interview across all eight participants was 57.75 minutes, with the longest interview lasting
75 minutes and the shortest interview lasting 24 minutes. Much of the participants’ reflection was
expected to transpire outside of the interview session, as they reflected on the interview questions
and their responses during this interview session. During this initial interview, questions were
asked that related only to the participants’ previous roles or experiences to remind them of these
instances that they might have faced in the workplace. These questions included “Tell me about a
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time when you were asked to do something that went against company policy”; “Have you ever
experienced a time when you felt that you had no good options? If so, what did you do?”; and
“Were you ever asked to alter or manipulate a security report?”. As the purpose of this study was
to understand the tensions related to information security reporting, the interview questions were
bracketed to this specific research topic area; however, the use of a semi-structured format was
continued when the participants provided responses that strayed from the research topic. The
participants were then allowed to give their answers, and a follow-up question was used to revert
the discussion back to the topic. The goal in this case was to facilitate the participants’ reflection
on the general experience while guiding them to more specific details of their experiences related
to the research topic. In this initial interview, the participants were asked to only provide facts of
the experiences, such as the point at which these experiences transpired in their careers, the
outcome of the event, and whether they still work with the same company or people involved in
those experiences. The goal of this interview was to begin the recollection process, and no time
was spent reflecting on the meanings of those experiences.
The second interview was conducted a minimum of two days following the initial interview
but no more than seven days after the interview; on average, it was conducted four days after the
initial interview. The lower time limit was set to provide the participants with the requisite time to
reflect on the initial interview, whereas the upper time limit was established to reduce the
likelihood that participants would begin to forget the reflections made between the interview
sessions. Whenever possible, the first interview was not be discussed during the second interview
to avoid straying into the meaning-making process that was reserved for the third interview
session. Nevertheless, the participants were individually asked if they had thought of anything
after the initial interview that they wish they had mentioned during the session. Only one
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participant provided an experience they wished to have recorded. As with the initial interview, a
strict 90-minute time limit was imposed, and similar fact-based questions were asked with the
difference being that the participants were asked to reflect on experiences from their current role
only. The average duration of the second interview was 42.88 minutes, with the longest session
lasting 66 minutes and the shortest one lasting 29 minutes. The second interview session was on
average approximately 15 minutes shorter in duration than the first one because the interview
questions were limited to the participant’s current role, whereas the initial interview covered all
the previous roles. As with the initial interview, a semi-structured interview format was used and
several questions were asked, such as “In your current role, have you had to deal with situations
that contradicted themselves? If so, what did you do?”; “Have you recently had to deal with issues
in which you felt that no good options were available?”; and “Have you been asked to alter or
manipulate a security report?”. The participants were once again asked to provide only the facts
related to their experiences and to avoid any meaning making or emotions that could be generated
as a result of recalling those experiences.
The third and final interview was conducted a minimum of two days but not more than
seven days following the second interview, and it averaged five days after the second interview.
This delay provided the researcher with time to create the questions for the third interview sessions
based on the responses that the participants provided in the previous two interview sessions; the
questions were designed to direct the participants in the reflection on those experiences and the
meanings they gave to those reflections (van Manan, 2016). As with the first two interviews, a
strict 90-minute time limit was imposed; however, in contrast to the first two interviews in which
fact-based questions were asked, the participants in the third interview were asked to reflect on the
experiences from the first two interviews. As a result, this final interview session had the longest
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duration averaging 65 minutes, with the longest session lasting 82 minutes and the shortest one
lasting 36 minutes. Special attention was given here to avoid too close a direction in guidance to
prevent any loss of richness of the raw material while all questions were still bracketed to provide
adequate direction for a meaningful guide in the reflection process (Walsham, 1995).
The participants were individually provided with a unique identifier to protect their
identity, and these unique identifiers were used in all the interview notes and subsequent analysis.
All the interview sessions were held in individual closed sessions that allowed the participants to
speak freely and to avoid noise during the recording of the sessions. As soon as possible following
each interview session, the digital recordings were transcribed using NVivo’s transcription service.
Once transcribed, all the transcriptions and any notes made by the researchers were then uploaded
to NVivo 12 for analysis. Twenty-two hours of interview sessions were audio-recorded, and 819
pages of transcription data were generated.
III.4

Phenomenological Analysis
Phenomenological analysis is an interpretive process that requires the researcher to

interpret the meanings of the study participants’ lived experiences (Alase, 2017; Smith et al.,
2013). Following the framework in Clark Moustakas’ 1994 book Phenomenological Research
Methods, the process of transcendental phenomenological analysis involves four stages. The first
stage, epoché, involves the researcher’s personal reflection as a means of recognizing that the
researcher must consider what they already know and how it may color the analysis of the study
data. This stage was especially important to this study, given that the main researcher is embedded
in the information security field and has some experience with information security reports being
altered or manipulated. In the second stage, phenomenological reduction, the coding and grouping
of core meanings by the participants are initiated. The third stage of imaginative variation requires
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the researcher to examine the possible meanings and interpretations of the themes generated in the
previous stage. Finally, in the fourth stage of synthesis of meanings, the researcher develops the
meanings of the participants’ experiences. In this study, this four-stage process allowed the
researcher to conduct multiple levels of analysis and to draw deep meaning from the experiences
as the analysis moves through the abstraction from the whole to the individual themes. Each stage
is discussed in detail in the subsequent sections.
III.4.1

Epoché

The first stage involves a personal reflection by the researcher. Developed by the founder
of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, epoché means to abstain or stay away from, and for the
researcher, epoché means to avoid prior knowledge that may create biases, prejudices, and
preconceived notions (Moustakas, 1994, p. 83). Hence, a focus on clearing the slate, starting with
a fresh canvas where all ideas are viewed, understandings, and new awareness are considered
evenly and with equal measure. Having prior experience with this research topic, the researcher
repeatedly returned to this stage during the analysis and between each phase to ensure his own
experiences were not generating a bias in the results. The outcome of the epoché should be that
nothing is predetermined because we, as the researchers, have removed our preconceived biases,
judgements, and determinations of what we were expecting. This stage inherently required a high
level of awareness of presumptions that lead us to the study in the first place, and it serves to
remind us that we must set aside those presumptions. Although the empirical analyses may indicate
that prior beliefs and intuits held true, these factors were identified prior to taking any further steps
by listing any presumptions of what the data may state before proceeding (Moustakas, 1994).
Nonetheless, this avoidance of prior knowledge does not signify that all presumptions were
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incorrect or excluded from the results, but rather that they did not have an effect on the final
analysis by coloring the evaluation and interpretation process.
Epoché is not a one-time process but is an overall state of mind that by returning to as the
study is conducted ensures that new ideas, concepts, and meanings were open to acceptance;
furthermore, the repeated use of the epoché allowed to more easily remove myself from the data
and to become attuned to what the data were conveying (Moustakas, 1994). As themes began to
emerge later in the analysis, returning to the epoché was essential to ensure that new biases and
beliefs have not closed my mind to fresh insights as a novel understanding of the phenomenon
under study was developed.
III.4.2

Phenomenological Reduction

With an improved understanding of the inherent biases that are brought to the study,
insights began to be drawn from the core meanings that the participants had developed by
reflecting on their own experiences and how those experiences had added meaning to their lives
(Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2013). Hence, key elements of the data were emphasized. First, the
research was bracketed whereby all the other topics and questions were discarded, allowing the
focus to be rooted on the research topic (Moustakas, 1994, p. 96). Moustakas uses the term
“horizonalizing” and describes it as the act of taking all the statements as being equal (Moustakas,
1994, p. 97). By “horizonalizing,” Moustakas indicates that all the statements made by the
participants are given an equal weight, and no judgements are made at this stage of the analysis
and nothing is categorized or counted as a duplicate. The participants’ statements were individually
reduced to their essences or themes. In a sense, the statements were paraphrased while retaining
the purity of their substance and dismissing any scientific reference; additionally, statements that
were unrelated to the research topic were removed, leaving only the meaning given by the
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participant. As a result of this “horizonalizing,” 283 tensions were detected as having been
experienced across all the participants, and 119 instances of resolution actions to those tensions
were identified. Themes began to emerge at this point; however, the researcher remained aware
that each statement was equal to all the other statements, and duplicates were not removed despite
the occurrence of clear patterns. Once all the statements had been reduced to their essence or
theme, the analysis process began. Duplicate statements were now removed, and similar
experiences were combined as they started to take shape as emergent themes (Miles, Huberman,
& Saldana, 2014, p. 86); furthermore, at this point the relationships began to emerge between them
as the gestalt of the phenomenon (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2013, p. 79).
III.4.3

Imaginative Variation

The analysis began to draw insights from the emergent themes developed in the previous
stage and started categorizing them into the possible meanings and essential structures of the
phenomenon (Moustakas, 1994, p. 97). All the possible variations were examined and the different
perspectives, roles, and interpretations were considered. In addition, the analysis began to consider
causation, context, and relationships as potential variables for the structures that had emerged
(Moustakas, 1994, p. 98). At this point in the analysis phase, the focus had been on the general
collection of data, followed by a slow filtering of the data into themes, and finally the analysis of
the data, viewing them from all angles and through different lenses. Questions were asked and
detailed notes were taken as the transcripts of the interviews were repeatedly read line-by-line,
with each reading taking a more critical view. In his 2018 book Crafting Phenomenological
Research, Mark Vagle states that multiple, line-by-line reading passes should be taken, each with
a different set of goals in mind, and all the transcripts should be read line-by-line before beginning
a second line-by-line pass (Vagle, 2018, p. 110). In this first reading, detailed notes were taken
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and comments were placed in the margin, along with parentheses or highlights for meanings that
were clear. Later readings included the articulation of observations and concepts that began to
appear. Vagle suggests at least three line-by-line readings of the transcripts to allow the repetition
to lead to a careful examination and triangulation of themes (Vagle, 2018, p. 108). Four rounds of
line-by-line readings were conducted, filtering down on each reading. At the end of this process,
118 unique experiences demonstrating tensions had been determined and 69 resolution actions to
these tensions were identified across all participants.
III.4.4

Synthesis of Meanings and Essences

This final stage constitutes the core of the phenomenological analysis process and involves
the meanings or essences of the participants’ perceptions as they understand them (Merleau-Ponty
& Landes 2012). The participants have their own perspectives of the world; hence, the researcher
must find the essence of their experiences (Giorgi, 2017) by synthesizing the meanings and
essences to uncover the gestalt of the phenomenon.
The synthesis represents the essences at the point in time for the participants and from each
participant’s unique standpoints, which do not signify an exhaustive study (Moustakas, 1994, p.
100). However, these unique viewpoints provide us with a representation of the phenomenon from
the perspective of the participants for whom all have differing levels of experience in the research
area. The outcome of this final stage of the analysis is an understanding of what was experienced
and how it was experienced, which is the contextual nature of the experience and the
phenomenological structure or meaning that was developed from the experience. This
phenomenological structure separates the phenomenon from a researcher’s personal interpretation
(Jackson et al., 2018). The final synthesis resulted in the identification of seven paradoxical
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tensions that affect the security reporting of information security professionals and the seven
actions that they undertake in attempting to resolve these tensions.
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RESULTS

An information security professional is obliged to uphold the organization’s information
security policies, federal regulations, and industry standards. All professional information security
certifications require the holder to uphold ethical/conduct standards. An example is the
International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium (ISC)2, which is recognized
as one of the leaders in information security certifications requiring certification holders to agree
to their code of ethics, including the adherence to “the highest ethical standards of behavior”
(isc2.org, 2020). In this light, information security professionals are expected to act in an ethical
manner. Even the ones who do not hold a professional certification are expected to act ethically in
their role as a protector of an organization’s assets. However, a thorough analysis of all the
participants’ experiences indicates that information security professionals are often confronted
with unethical demands or practices that create a paradox (Lewis, 2000). These paradoxes are in
the form of contradictions or mixed messages (Lewis, 2000; Putnam, 1986), and we have identified
seven common drivers of tensions experienced by the participants, which resulted in the unethical
behavior of false reporting or manipulation of information security reports. These seven drivers of
tensions are unethical security culture, a fear of looking bad, tight deadlines or scoping issues, lack
of experience or knowledge, perceptions of security, team politics, and coercion. In dealing with
these drivers of tensions, information security professionals undertake actions to resolve the
tension that often creates new tensions that must be addressed. Being forced to deal with a latent
tension that brings the tension into salience frequently generates a paradox that must be managed.
Based on the study results, seven common resolutions used by information security professionals
to resolve the drivers of tensions emerged, including denying responsibility, attempting to change
the organization, self-protection, self-education, repressing the tension, forming tight subgroups,
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and withdrawing from the tension. The descriptions and respective examples as experienced by
the participants are provided below.
IV.1

Drivers of Tensions

IV.1.1

Unethical Security Culture

Similar to individuals, organizations intend to portray themselves in the best possible light
to outside observers. When information security professionals apply to an organization, they are
presented with this portrait of virtue, and they cannot determine the true culture of the organization
until they are able to see behind the curtain. One participant described his organization as a “paper
fort” and stated,
It was a couple months in…[some of my co-workers and I] ended up
referring to [the company] as a paper fort. It was like this image of
grandeur in the security posture, [and] there was a lot of posturing.
Culture in an organization is developed by management, and the demands that management
make on security professionals reflect that culture. Many participants mentioned demands that
met ethical standards, such as reducing a security finding because a mitigating control was in
place that reduced the likelihood of the issue being exploited. However, they also identified
many instances of unethical demands made by management.
One participant who was new to the industry described an instance in which he was
involved in a security audit and the auditor asked for the screenshots of a four-month period for a
certain system. The security professional was instructed by his management to gather the
screenshots of a different period that looked better and to remove the date and time from the
screenshot when providing the evidence to the auditor so the auditor would not know. When
asked to further explain this incident, the participant stated,
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When I was asked to do it, it was unusual. It seemed like an unusual
request because when I was at [another company], that was the
standard, you always collected the date and time; prior to that
[situation]…my experience was nonexistent…I did not necessarily
question it more than I reaffirmed their request with them to make
sure that it was okay.
When the participant later asked management why he was being advised to alter the evidence for
a security audit report, he was advised to “not worry about it” and informed that the issue would
be brushed off by management. As this example illustrates, management in an unethical security
culture takes advantage of inexperienced security professionals.
Another participant recounted that early in her career, she was hired with neither any
experience nor certifications and was instructed to perform tasks that violated industry
regulations; furthermore, the organization would often joke about how inexperienced the new
hires were and did not know any better. Once she achieved her professional certification, she
realized the number of regulations being violated by the company:
I did not really understand the full ram of the standard..., once I
actually went through that entire process [of] getting my
certification and really, truly understanding…how my approach to
this from an ethical perspective and from an interpretation
perspective was correct. [Moreover], I have been told the wrong
things all the time. That was [the moment] when I realized that,
okay, Houston, we have a problem here.
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After realizing that management had been advising her incorrectly regarding the industry
standards, she approached management with her concerns, only to be told that she simply did not
know what she was talking about because she was relatively new to the industry. This type of
statement was indicated by most participants from early in their careers when they asked
management about practices that they felt were unethical or manipulative. Such unethical
security culture becomes pervasive and information security professionals subsequently begin to
accept it as the standard. As one participant noted,
There [were] no ethics. It was unethical around here that we all
might as well just have some fun in the meantime. That’s literally
the attitude that a number of us adopted.
This unethical culture is adopted by security professionals as management continues to
make unethical or manipulative demands. These demands are most often made because of
management’s fears.
IV.1.2

Fear of Looking Bad

Management is the responsible party for information security reports that are delivered to
the executive leadership. These reports frequently include information about areas where the
organization is failing. Many participants described the management’s fear of reporting unpleasant
news to the executive leadership. As an example of this case, one participant who had a decade of
experience in information security and had moved into a management role himself described why
the reports were being altered:
Up the management chain is where things tend to get a little bit
shifted in how they get reported…Matters are [frequently]
downplayed just to save face…[hence], numerous risks become
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slightly muddled to make them look not as bad as they actually are
so that people don’t look bad.
An experienced participant, a security analyst at the time, described a manager who was
afraid to report security issues to the executives. This fear prompted him to alter all the reports
they had generated. In one instance, an external team was hired to provide the organization with a
baseline of the identity and access management (IAM) program. The goal was to obtain a real
picture of where the program was currently so that efforts could be undertaken to mature the
program. When the report was provided to the manager, he decided to alter it even before sending
it to the board of directors. The manager justified this action by stating, “If this [report] gets to the
board in this format, I’ll be fired.” The security analyst notified the HR department about the
manager’s actions; someone from HR proceeded to speak with the manager, but nothing was done
and no reprimand was given. The security analyst later learned that the manager’s senior leader
was also altering the reports before they were sent to the executive leadership. As a result of this
unethical security practice, the security team knew that two levels of management above them
were altering the security reports and feared that if the issue were taken any higher, then the entire
team would be fired.
Another participant was new to the security field after having changed careers from the
financial industry. Having moved across the country to start a new career, the participant began
work with a security team responsible for identifying and patching security vulnerabilities in the
organization’s network. He immediately realized that management did not care about the work
that was being done and that only the final numbers were reported. The participant explained that
when he first started, management did not seem to understand how the patching process worked.
The organization had not patched any of its systems for several years, which indicated that the
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patching process must be conducted in a layered approach, and a patch would often break other
processes once applied. This highly manual process required an ample amount of time to complete.
A patch that caused another issue would subsequently increase the number of total issues that were
reported each week. The participant recalled a conversation with the manager, which demonstrated
the latter’s goals:
What can we do to fix this [issue]? I have to report it to the higher
up. What can you do to the numbers to help me with this?
The participant believed that his being new to the field was getting his team in trouble and the
numbers being reported were his fault. He spent several months learning everything that he could
about the process until he was certain that he was not the problem. To assist his team in getting the
numbers where management wanted them, he would work off the clock on weekends and in the
evenings to help lower the numbers for the weekly report. He approached the manager and tried
to explain the nature of the problem and how the patching process worked. However, after repeated
attempts to educate the manager on how the patching process worked and the manager continuing
to insist on the total numbers being the only concern that mattered, the team lead began to alter the
reports to please the manager. As the participant described,
Instead of reporting on the 35 systems that we manage, [we] only
report on 10 of those and…make sure that they are the ones that the
vulnerabilities are going down the most on.
This case demonstrates how leadership sets the culture for the organization. As the security
teams notice management acting in an unethical manner and making unethical demands on the
security professionals, they begin to undertake the necessary actions to complete the job.
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Another participant who was highly experienced at the time of the study described the
unethical culture in a previous organization from early in her career:
[I was] in a company that…I really didn’t care about. We would
take three-hour lunches because…there [were] no ethics. It’s
unethical around here, [so] we all might as well have fun in the
meantime.
Reporting the unethical issues to leadership or to a regulatory body also generates fear for security
professionals. As illustrated in the aforementioned example, reporting the issue to HR did nothing,
and knowing that at least two levels of management above the team were altering reports produced
the fear of being terminated.
Another participant who had several years of management experience was asked about
reporting the unethical practices to a regulatory body. He replied that the reporting of any issues
to the federal regulators would be a “sealed death wish,” denoting that he was guaranteed to be
terminated because the organization would know that he had reported the issues. As an example,
the participant recounted an incident when a negative review was added to a job board. Within a
few days of the review being posted, he was called into the office and “accused of making
inflammatory, scandalous remarks against the company, without [being] given the option to defend
[himself].” As the organization did not believe that he had not written the review, he decided to
investigate the issue himself to save his job. The experience left him with no doubt that reporting
issues to the federal regulators would result in the organization knowing where the report came
from, stating, “If I were to make a complaint to a regulatory agency, they would know that it came
from me.” Several participants described similar experiences in which they attempted to report
unethical behavior to leadership or to HR, only to realize that reporting did nothing to solve the
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issue. Other participants underscored the fear of reporting unethical practices, indicating that the
culture was such that unethical practices were the norm and reporting would result in their
termination.
Some participants reported a fear of the manager and described demanding bosses,
portraying behaviors that affected the reports as they attempted to avoid their supervisors. One
participant explained that her manager was highly demanding and would question her endlessly
about any security finding she reported. This level of scrutiny prompted her to alter how she would
generate reports, stating,
When you’re communicating to your manager and…intentionally
avoiding digging in and just saying it’s low risk to avoid that
confrontation with your boss.
Most of the issues reported by the participants were related to security roles that were internal to
the organization. Nonetheless, external roles were not exempt from reporting issues related to fear.
Several participants held external information security roles at previous organizations, with
four participants working in an external role at the time of the study. Similar to the internal roles,
the security professionals who conducted external security reports also experienced levels of fear
that affected the security reports; however, those fears were generally related to a fear of losing
the client’s business. One participant described an instance in which the organization had suffered
a security breach. At the time, the participant was a new security manager with the organization
and asked about the reporting process so as to properly notify the clients about the breach. The
upper management team explicitly declared that no report would be given:
Absolutely not. We don’t want [to] look bad. We already had some
issues. We’ve been in the news…we can’t allow this [situation] to
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be known because [the client] is just going to go over to [the
competition].
The upper management was afraid of losing their clients to the competition and because they had
recently received some bad publicity, they refused to generate a breach report. Other participants
described the management’s fear of losing the business if the security reports had too many
findings and not being invited back to conduct the security reviews in the future.
One participant who is new to the security field described the instructions that had been
given by her manager in an attempt to ensure that the organization was asked to return in the future:
There was a bit more focus on…very careful word choice to still be
accurate, but also not cause those feelings of, oh, we’re not going to
hire them in the future, because that’s…part of doing [the] work,
wanting to maintain a good reporting relationship.
Although the preceding case was not described by many participants as unethical, some of them
explained that management demanded that the wording be altered to reduce the impact of the
findings on the security report. This attempt to reduce the impact of a finding on the security report
to make the report appear less of an issue is not considered ethical. The report should be created
using the facts to allow the organization’s leadership to make decision how to resolve any issues
the report has identified.
Moreover, all the participants mentioned issues that related to security reporting in one
form or another, which were due to management’s involvement in altering or ordering the
modification of a security report or a fear of the manager that led to the security report being
changed as a means of avoiding the manager.
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IV.1.3

Tight Deadlines or Scoping Issues

Many participants reported that tight deadlines and scoping issues resulted in the security
reports either being altered or lacking in accuracy due to the tensions they faced. Most of these
examples were related to external security reporting roles and the time they were given to identify
and report the security issues. Several examples that one participant provided included security
engagements that were scoped for 40 hours of work. This time included detecting any security
issues, validating those issues, and generating a report. Prior to the engagement being scoped for
40 hours, the number of security issues that would be found was unknown. In many instances, far
more security issues were expected and could be validated in the time allotted for the engagement.
In one case, the participant described that she would ask for more time to conduct the assessment.
She would sometimes get more time and at other times she would not. In one instance of not being
given sufficient time, she had a discussion with her manager:
If I’m neither generating a good report nor doing a deep-dive
manual review, [then] do not blame me because you’re not going to
give me more than 40 hours.
The participant described other members of her team who would only report on what they could
in the time given and would ignore the rest. This approach would leave the security reports
inaccurate, and many findings would not be reported. In many instances, the participants reported
working extra hours off the clock to meet tight deadlines as a result of poor scoping prior to the
engagement. When asked how this affected her life, the participant replied,
It’s just very exhausting because you’re putting in more hours,
which again takes away time from your personal life…. It even
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impacts your health because you don’t have enough time to do
things that are beyond sitting at your desk.
One participant was advised by his doctor that for health reasons, he needed to leave the
external security role he had been in for 10 years because of its negative impact on his health. The
extra hours required to meet these deadlines affected not only the participant’s health but also the
security reporting.
Another participant who was working as an external security auditor explained that in
addition to gaining weight due to the long hours she was working to meet the deadlines, she was
putting in 65–70 hours, seven days a week because the company was assigning her 20 clients at a
time. These long hours each week caused the reports to be rushed and some matters to be
overlooked. According to the participant, her organization’s requirement was to get as many
security assessments completed as possible regardless of accuracy:
[We] pushed the clients through, regardless of their actual state,
[and we were tasked to] handle 20 clients when we shouldn’t.
[Thus,] some things will be missed, which occurred all the time.
In this instance, the regulating body suggested each security assessor should not maintain more
than three clients. Nonetheless, her organization would routinely have each assessor engaging with
20 clients at a time to drive the business growth.
In several instances the participants described issues with reporting due to limitations in
the scope of the engagement. One participant recalled an engagement that had been scoped several
years prior and was limited to only two types of security vulnerabilities she was allowed to report.
When the participant would scan the applications for security vulnerabilities, she would find many
different types of security issues; however, she was prevented from reporting them to the
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organization because the scope of the engagement specified only two types of security
vulnerabilities. Based on this limited scope, management refused to include any security
vulnerabilities that were found in addition to the two that were mentioned in the scope of work.
Many participants described internal teams attempting to bypass the security team or to
bring in the security team late into a project as they are close to the deadline, attempting to force
the security team to provide a quick approval. One experienced participant, whose role as a security
manager was to conduct phishing campaigns and report the results to show the number of people
in the organization who fall for the fake phishing emails, underscored the executive management’s
attempts to falsely increase the pass rate. The executive would require the manager to notify him
prior to sending out the phishing campaign; the executive would subsequently alert the
organization about the phishing emails that were coming and alert everyone to be ready for them.
To contend with this executive’s attempt to manipulate the data, the security manager had to alter
his approach:
I just…resolved it myself and just [did] it all in one shot instead of
over a two or three-week period. I still told them I was doing it, I
just sent it all out in one shot to get a…more accurate number.
All the participants mentioned some form of deadline or scoping issue that influenced the security
reports. Most of them acknowledged working extra hours on their own time to meet the deadlines,
with many stating that poorly scoped security engagements had the largest effect on the reports
due to time constraints. Those time constraints were usually due to a higher than expected number
of security findings, whereas others were due to the security teams being brought in late in an
attempt to reduce the amount of time within which to perform their reporting function.
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IV.1.4

Lack of Experience or Knowledge

For the participants, the lack of experience or knowledge was related to both management
and the security professionals being managed. However, this lack of experience was not limited to
those working in the security field but was extended to those security professionals engaged in
their reporting roles. For security professionals, this lack of experience was typically related to
being new to the field or when changing to a new security domain. One participant recounted a
case in which new security analysts were writing reports after validating their findings:
That expertise wasn’t there…yet to ensure if it’s being vetted
correctly or not; a couple of analysts would not report everything,
and it turned out that they were missing out [on] true positive
findings.
Another participant who at the time was a manager described a similar issue they
experienced in their own team from new security analysts whom they supervised. The team was
responsible for triaging security issues that were sent to them through a ticketing system. The
analysts would quickly close out a security ticket, and the participant began questioning whether
the issue was actually resolved:
A lot of times you would actually question the amount of visibility
that the team had [or] how well they can actually deep dive into an
issue. So, you would [repeatedly] see an issue get closed pretty
quickly and you’d scratch your head a little bit and say, okay, is
that…really addressed, or are we just moving right along because
we’re a little bit blind
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With new security managers, the lack of experience was portrayed as typically resulting in a lack
of confidence that leads to security reports being submitted in an automated fashion instead of
having the findings vetted for fear of the team missing a false positive.
A more experienced female participant stated that she disagreed with her team supervisor
on what should be included in the security report. She argued that false positives should be
removed to make the security report as accurate as possible and to avoid the false positives causing
confusion in the final report. As she explained, “Initially, the person…whom I was reporting to
was not as experienced.” This lack of experience prompted the supervisor to require the team to
report everything to the client because she was not adequately experienced to be confident that all
the false positives were being properly vetted before being removed from the report. The same
participant later indicated that a new, more experienced supervisor came in, and the team began
vetting the findings and generating more accurate security reports.
Another experienced female participant was hired as a security manager for an
organization. During the interview sessions, she was advised that her department would be audited
in two months after she started; just two weeks into her new role, the participant received an email
from the security auditor advising her that he would be there the next day. In this instance, the
participant described going into the security audit completely unprepared and with very limited
knowledge of the organization on which she was being audited. During the security audit, she was
joined by her chief information security officer (CISO) who was also not knowledgeable in the
areas being audited. As the participant recalled,
We were noncompliant in so many areas; I was two weeks [in], and
I didn’t know who to go to. [Even] my CISO [claimed that] he didn’t

56

know who to go to[stating]…the manager who was here before you
did all that.
The participant described answering to the best of her ability with the limited knowledge she had
and not directly answering other questions, with the CISO seated behind the assessor shaking his
head yes or no depending on the question. Although this situation was not directly related to the
altering of security reports, it demonstrated the types of inexperience that the security professionals
must deal with, which affect the accuracy of the reports.
Similar to the previous situation, several participants mentioned working with stakeholders
to gather the information they needed to generate the security reports. When asked if the
stakeholders ever provided false information, an inexperienced female participant advised that
such cases frequently occurred yet proved difficult to catch:
You can tell when they don’t give you the [entire] story; instead they
just offer a small piece of the pie and try to evade.
When asked to provide an example of this evasion, the participant cited a client who was queried
about a very specific encryption setting:
I remember [an incident when] we, as an audit team, became
convinced that it was not [encrypted], and they were not showing us
and not really understanding…[that] we needed to see a specific
functionality; it’s a screen that’s a check box [indicating whether]
it’s encrypted or not. They sort of avoided showing us that screen.
Many of the participants described similar issues and confirmed the difficulty in catching the
stakeholders providing false information. This evasion and false information have a direct effect
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on the accuracy of security reports. The participants repeatedly depicted these stakeholders’
actions as being due to a perception of the security teams, which leads them to fear security.
IV.1.5

Perceptions of Security

As mentioned in the previous section, security professionals must deal with stakeholders
to gather the information needed to generate security reports. This effort is often hampered by the
perception that many stakeholders have of information security teams. Many stakeholders are
afraid to engage the security teams. One participant with over a decade of experience in
information security described how many stakeholders he has encountered over the years feel
about security stating:
The main issue that I’ve seen over and over and over again in
companies is that IT is trying to move at 60 mph, [striving] to meet
the demands of the business, and [then] security comes along. I
don’t know that security necessarily says, [you] need to be going at
45 mph, but I think that that’s the perception that IT gets from
security, [suggesting the] need to slow down in what you’re doing,
making sure you’re thinking through it, but that doesn’t necessarily
lead to the best practices.
This perception of security engenders many of the issues that security professionals experience,
which affect the security report when working with stakeholders.
Another participant new to his career described working with a high-level manager who
would bypass the security teams altogether because her experience was that security was going to
prevent her from doing what she felt was necessary. As soon as an issue was sent for review by
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the security team, she would escalate the issue to the executive team in an attempt to remove the
security teams from the decision process.
A participant who now owns his own security consulting business explained that this
perception of security is due to the security teams and the IT department all reporting to the chief
information officer (CIO). As he explained,
The outcomes and the objectives, what they’re measured on, are
vastly different. So, IT gets beaten up by the business to deliver
solutions in enablement as quickly as possible, whereas security is
sometimes perceived as a roadblock to both of those [efforts].
Two teams that closely work together are the application development teams and the
application security teams. The application security team is responsible for scanning the
applications for security vulnerabilities prior to the usage of the application in a production
environment. This aspect causes the development team’s general dislike for the security team. In
describing this rivalry, an experienced participant noted that the application development team felt
that the application security team was similar to “somebody who passes on numerous commands
and [acts in an]…extremely authoritative manner, [which] somewhat also creates a gap between
the app teams and the security teams.” The participants concurred that this rivalry has led to many
instances in which the application teams would delay the submission of information to the security
team to prevent the latter from reporting issues, or constantly insist that the security team was
wrong and continuously demand that the security team proves its findings in an attempt to wear
down the team.
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Most of the experiences that the participants provided were related to internal stakeholders
or departments and their perceptions of the security teams. One experienced participant expressed
his perspective on security teams:
As [an external] consultant, [I notice that] you are insulated from
the internal politics and the internal battles that occur. You could
see [the situation] happening. The writing was on the wall, but I
would say most of the time you’re out of the room when those kinds
of conversations happen.
Although external security professionals are not as directly affected as the internal teams, they are
also influenced by the perceptions of the security teams.
In addition to this perception, external security professionals had to deal with the client’s
certain level of mistrust. An experienced participant described her experience with this distrust as
follows:
[The clients] already have some perception that they’re not sure
whether the work is quality work or not, or…who exactly has worked
on it. They do not know much about the person, So, I think the doubts
kind of… build…and [this mindset] reflects [in their behavior].
With regard to offshore security teams, the perceptions are even more pronounced. The same
participant, who had several years of experience in an offshore security team, recalled one such
instance:
Clients expect that the consultant does everything because they are
paying us for the work. So, we are answerable for everything. In that
case, we are doing the assessment and helping them to build out a
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program…everything is expected. [However,] it’s not possible to get
everything done within 40 hours a week.
This perception that members of the security team are responsible for everything because they are
being paid to perform a job results in a huge demand on the offshore consultants assigned to the
client. As previously mentioned, when the scope of the engagement does not allow sufficient time
for completion within 40 hours, the ensuing reports become inaccurate; unless the security
professional works off the clock to meet the demands, many issues do not get reported.
Not every experience that the participants described was a negative one. A participant cited
an instance in which an internal department head asked the security team to alter a security report
to make it appear as a higher risk than the security team was reporting it. As the department head
perceived the security team as being capable of advancing his initiatives, he used the altered report
to gain a budget that he felt was needed to move the initiative forward.
IV.1.6

Team Politics

Most teams have some level of politics that are inherent and build over time as the
individuals work with each other. This case is also true for information security teams; nonetheless,
most of the participants stated these team politics as being responsible in many instances for
inaccuracies in the security reports. A participant who had close to three years of experience at the
time cited an occurrence in which a security analyst was holding a grudge against a manager and
would bypass the QA process and instead directly send the security report to the client. The intent
was to get the manager in trouble for any mistakes in the report. The same analyst stated that they
would do anything they could to distort the quality of the work because they did not care about the
work and wanted the manager to look bad. As the participant explained,
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They didn’t care about the work. [The situation] was more personal.
I think they took [it] more personally. They didn’t care…if they did
not agree with the upper management or the lead; they would do
whatever distorted it.
The same participant recalled that upon assuming a new role, she was met by a man who had been
with the organization for over a decade. She initially thought that he was attempting to help her
and was interested in how she found and validated security vulnerabilities. She immediately
realized that he was uninterested in learning from her but rather was attempting to sabotage her.
This individual would ask her throughout the day about the matters she was working on. He would
subsequently report to her supervisor that she was not doing what she was supposed to be doing
according to him. When her manager spoke with her, he advised her that this individual had applied
for the role she had but was denied. As a result, he was constantly trying to communicate with her
each day and made the work environment hostile, causing her to dislike going to the office and
bringing a negative effect to her security reporting.
An experienced participant described an experience with an application developer. When
the participant started with a new organization, she made a mistake in scanning an application,
which resulted in the scan going much deeper than expected. As a result, the application
development team began to question everything that she had done and even suggested that she be
terminated for the mistake. As she gained further experience and became more proficient, the
dislike persisted, and the application development team would deny any finding she uncovered
when scanning their application, thereby making her job more difficult. The participant described
one encounter in which the application development team refused to accept her finding report and
scheduled a meeting to demand that she explain herself. She described this encounter as follows:
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He had his team involved in the call, and his leads, my leads, and I
were all involved. I had to be on the call and he wanted me to speak
up on the call instead of anybody else because…I guess it was just
somebody who…already made a mistake, and this again was the
same person. [However,] I did show him that [it] was a cross-site
script.
After proving her finding in front of the team supervisors for both teams, the issue did not improve
between her and the individual from the development team, as the application development team
did not want to look bad and its members felt embarrassed that she was able to find an exploit and
prove it in front of everyone. This same participant described how office politics would impede in
her obtaining the information she needed to complete the security reports. When she would ask for
a particular training or documentation that she required to conduct a security review, she would be
blocked by the individual responsible for approving it due to her relationship with someone this
individual had a clash with inside the office. As a result, she could not perform her job properly,
and the security report would suffer.
Several participants mentioned security analysts who would intentionally neglect their
responsibilities so that others on the team would be forced to step in and perform the task they had
avoided. An inexperienced participant recounted an issue at his first company where the team
would designate one individual each day to work the “hot seat,” that is, the ticketing queue. At the
time, the individual was responsible for reviewing and remediating the security issues that were
sent to the team while everyone else on the team would work on their individual assignments or
special projects. As the participant explained,

63

People are assigned the hot seat daily; on certain days, you can see
the tickets go down and on other days, the tickets really aren’t
getting picked up.
This situation caused the rest of the team to pick up the extra work for those analysts who were
not working the “hot seat” as required, resulting in less time for the security analysts to work on
their security reports.
Another participant cited a similar experience early in his career, in which the organization
had certain service level agreements to resolve high-priority tickets within 15 minutes of opening
them. As some security issues were more difficult to resolve than others, several security analysts
would only open the lower priority tickets that were easier to resolve within the 15-minute
requirement. As a result, the high-level security issues would sit in the queue for sometimes six to
eight hours before someone would begin working on them. From a security perspective, this delay
had the potential to allow an attacker in the network for that many hours before the issue was even
reviewed.
IV.1.7

Coercion

The participants often mentioned discussions with their supervisors and leadership team
addressing the unethical demands they were being given. Several participants stated their refusal
to sign off on altered or manipulated reports; furthermore, in almost all of these encounters, the
participants described their leadership’s attempt at coercion when their demands were refused, and
intimidation failed. Most attempts at coercion can be considered mild, but many participants
indicated coercion attempts that went past the mild nature. The same common theme was observed
in every example of extreme coercion that the participants depicted. It typically followed the same
model whereby a threat was not directed at the individual but rather at those with whom they
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worked. In addition, several participants acknowledged their refusal to act unethically and instead
expressed a willingness to accept the consequences for their refusal. However, these same
participants faltered when confronted with the consequences being paid by others in the
organization.
Many instances that the participants described regarding security professionals interacting
with stakeholders included mild forms of coercion attempt to convince them to alter the report or
reduce a finding. As one inexperienced female participant who conducts security and privacy
audits indicated, stakeholders would make statements as follows:
My boss is not going to like it if this issue or this finding comes up
on my report, and [I’m] responsible for it.
Other participants mentioned similar instances in which stakeholders would make statements
asking if there was any way the security professional could help them with the report because they
were afraid that their boss would fire them if they did not get it changed. A participant, who at the
time was a security manager, recalled a case in which he refused to sign off on an altered report
for ethical reasons. However, his leadership waited until he was out of the office and subsequently
directed one of his subordinates to sign off, stating that “the security analysts were afraid to say
‘no’ to the upper management.”
A female participant new to the security field described her experience in which a client
tried to get the security analyst to reduce the severity of their findings, claiming the test was
improperly conducted, or that the findings were false positives even though the findings had been
validated. The intent was to scare the security analyst into changing the findings for fear of being
made to look incompetent.
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Several instances of more extreme coercion attempts were highlighted by the more
experienced participants. One participant mentioned an experience from early in her career when
the organization instructed her to do whatever it took to ensure that a major client passed the
security assessment. To ensure that she did what she was told, the organization attempted to
threaten her coworkers:
This is how we’re going to pay our bonuses; this is how we’re going
to be able to close the year and hire more people.
As the participant explained, the organization threatened them with the non-payment of Christmas
bonuses if she did not comply with the directive. She added that her organization’s attempt to
threaten her into compliance with unethical demands was expressed as follows:
If we lose this client, then you’re talking about losing jobs. People
are going to lose their jobs. [Such statement] was literally
[articulated] upfront. A lot of times, [the discussion] would go back
to that statement, or [even this one]: “we’re going to lose this big
client to our competition up the street and…people are going to lose
their jobs.”
The participant believed that “they [somehow] knew that this string was the one to pull with me
and they pulled it, they pulled it very well.”
Another participant who at the time was highly experienced in his career described an
instance involving his organization where his leadership ordered him to ensure that a security
report had a certain outcome:
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I was told that if the outcome was X, then it would be bad for
everyone. Therefore, the outcome should be Y. I was then told to
figure out how to [turn] X into Y.
When asked if he felt that the consequences would solely fall on him, he replied that he was told
that “It would be bad for everyone.”
A male participant with several years of management experience cited a case involving his
organization, which escalated to coercion. He recalled that the leadership initially attempted to
convince the security manager to sign off on a security report that included findings that had not
been remediated. The reason was that the client had threatened to take its business elsewhere. The
company was willing to sign off on the bad report because it did not intend to lose the client’s
money. The participant explained that the threats from upper management were initially subtle,
beginning with a demand that he sign off on the report. The leadership became increasingly
manipulative and used coercion (i.e., if he did not sign off, the company might fail, or people
would be fired). Although the company never made a direct threat to him, it opted to threaten
others in the organization.
IV.2

Resolution Actions
As previously mentioned, information security professionals are forced to deal with these

drivers of tensions, and in doing so, those tensions become salient and must be addressed. In many
instances, as the tension is resolved, it develops into an entirely new tension that must again be
handled (Lewis, 2000; Putnam et al., 2016). Dealing with these salient tensions compels an
individual to choose between two competing requirements; hence, these two competing
requirements become a paradoxical tension. This study identifies seven common themes that the
participants described based on their information security reporting-related experiences. The
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resolution steps undertaken by the participants are viewed not through a moral lens that
distinguishes right from wrong but rather from the demonstrated actions that the participants
performed in resolving those tensions.
IV.2.1

Denying Responsibility

The main resolution step undertaken by the participants was to deny responsibility for any
unethical behavior that they might have committed. Even when the participants acknowledged
other resolution steps taken when confronted by a tension, most of them either started or ended
with their lack of responsibility for the unethical behavior.
For a participant who was still new to the information security field (i.e., having less than
three years of experience), this resolution step was primarily employed for contending with a
paradoxical tension. He was able to cope with management’s demands that he felt were unethical
by putting the responsibility on management who had made the unethical demand. The participant
provided several examples of this behavior and described one experience where he was involved
in a security audit and the security auditor requested that the organization provide her with
screenshots from a specific four-month period. The participant was instructed to alter the evidence
before giving it to the security auditor by providing a different time period that looked better and
making sure that the screenshots excluded the date and time so the auditor could not tell that the
evidence was being fabricated. When asked about his role in this unethical behavior, the participant
denied responsibility twice, once placing the responsibility on the auditor, noting, “I think it’s up
to the auditor to be able to attest that the date and time provided are accurate.” He added that he
did not excessively worry about providing the false evidence because he felt it was the auditor’s
responsibility to validate the evidence she was given, stating, “If it was a big deal, [then] the auditor
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would say something.” When pushed further on the subject, the participant placed the
responsibility on the manager:
There was a little bit of a conflict when it came to providing the
evidence that I was told to provide versus the evidence I believe I
should have provided. Did I challenge that (issue)? No, I didn’t. It
was basically at the direction of my supervisor, and so I [simply
complied] when they told me to provide the evidence [that they
wanted].
This experience was common with those participants early in their careers at the time of the study.
In addition, the more experienced participants described similar experiences from early in their
careers.
An experienced participant who described his earlier career explained that he was initially
worried about getting caught altering the security reports, but he eventually decided that he was
only doing what management had wanted. He knew that he was mentally justifying his actions by
indicating that the responsibility was on management’s shoulders and not his own, but he was also
aware that should he be questioned, he would be unable to justify his actions.
For many of the participants, the primary reason for denying responsibility was their
financial position at the time. These experiences were described by those participants in the lower
experience group as more current and the ones in the more experience group as transpiring early
in their careers. An inexperienced participant cited an experience where he had relocated from the
East Coast to the West Coast at his own expense to begin his security career. He was not in a
financial position to be able to walk away once he realized the unethical practices that were being
required of him. As he stated,
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Nobody was financially in a place where we could hold our ethics
higher…So, it was okay if this is what they’re asking for and I’m
going to keep my job; I’m going to give them what they asked for.
The participant added that he was afraid of not only losing his job because of his financial position
but also of being caught engaging in the unethical behavior. He states that he was a combat vet
and had seen combat including being blown up and shot at and was never as afraid as he was when
thinking about being caught and losing his job.
The lack of a financial ability to walk away from a role was the most common reason given
for continuing to perform unethical actions when management demanded them. All the participants
described their attempts to speak out when they felt that the demand was unethical; nonetheless,
even the most experienced participants would eventually relent and engage in the unethical action.
One participant new in her career explained that she tries to speak up and make her voice
heard when she feels that something is not right, but management simply ignores her. Hence, she
simply leaves the matter alone and justifies it as management’s responsibility, even as she raises
her objections.
Another female participant new in her career explained that at her level, she feels that if
she were to be confronted by someone whom she believed was unethical, she would report it to
her leader and the matter would then become the leadership’s responsibility. If nothing is done,
then the burden is not on her because she took action to report it.
IV.2.2

Attempting to Change the Organization

Once the participants realized that their organization has an unethical security culture or
are asked to engage in an unethical action to alter a security report or manipulate evidence, they
all described attempts to change the organization. As an experienced male participant explained,
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It’s that bit of an idealistic approach…I’m here to change this and
make it better. And…it was articulated that there was support for
this. [However,] after a period of time, it was just lip service…. I
tried some different avenues and [even attempted] to escalate the
various channels, but again, nothing happened.
This participant was advised by the leadership at the time he was hired that he was being brought
in to help mature the security culture and to search ways of improving the program, and he was
promised full support from the leadership.
Another experienced male participant explained that when he first came to the
organization, he strived to improve the security culture, but the leadership would fight him on
everything. He eventually stopped trying to fight. The attempts to change an organization were
generally described by the more experienced participants as they recounted their earlier career
experiences.
An experienced female participant recalled that when she first started as an assessor in a
highly regulated field, she had no experience and had to rely on her management to direct her in
what should be done. Once she earned a professional certification and knew the regulatory
requirements and industry standards, she realized that the company was conducting numerous
activities that were in violation of the regulations. She initially tried to explain the areas where the
organization was failing against the standards, but she was ignored and told that she was too new
and did not know anything. This participant later refused to sign off on a report that lacked accurate
information, believing that doing so would be unethical. Her organization simply had another of
the senior assessors sign off on her work. Several attempts were eventually made, and she realized
that regardless of her efforts, the organization would not change:
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Okay, I am done, you’re not even trying to fix anything. I understand
we’re all stressed, and I understand you have a small
organization…we’re screwing up clients’ information. I [finally
said to myself] that’s it, I’m done.
The more experienced participants mentioned similar experiences that ultimately led to their
leaving the organization. The aforementioned participant stated that she knew that the company
was unethical and had an unethical security culture, and she tried to fix it at first; she eventually
realized that nothing she did was going to fix the organization.
An experienced male participant cited the same experience; after realizing that the
company was unwilling to change and the senior leadership was unethical in altering the security
reports, he began to mentally check out. He no longer had faith in the company and acknowledged
that he could not work to make positive changes.
IV.2.3

Self-protection

As the participants began to realize that efforts to change the organization were not working
and started to fear being associated with the unethical behavior being demanded of them by
management, they described taking actions to protect themselves should their actions be noticed.
The most common form of self-protection involved documenting the management’s unethical
demands. According to one experienced female participant, she began to record the issues that she
believed were unethical. When management would instruct her to change a security report that did
not comply with a regulation or industry standard, she would document what management had
directed her to do. She resorted to this move to ensure that certain matters were recorded to show
her disagreement with the practice.
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In a similar case, an experienced male participant related how the upper management was
altering the security reports before submitting them to the board of directors:
We definitely retained all of our copies of how [the materials] were
drafted. Sometimes even during the revisions, we would change
[issues] back to the state from which they were [altered].
Retaining the original copies or adding notes to the original one was a common theme for
many participants, and it became a practice that they continued to employ into their careers. As
one of the less experienced female participants explained, in addition to her own notes and
documentation, she would include comments in her assessments that she disagreed with the
approach, but that management wanted it done in a certain manner. She said that she would exhaust
all efforts that could serve as evidence that she was not acting unethically, but that management
was.
In another example, an experienced male participant recounted that early in his career, his
manager would generate two sets of reports. One report included a comprehensive set of numbers
for all of the systems and a second one that was altered to remove the systems that had bad numbers
as management requested. The second report was sent to the leadership, but the original security
report was stored in the manager’s desk drawer in case anything came back on the team.
A female participant who is early in her career revealed that she forces management to say
or write out exactly what they want her to do when she perceives that the action to be unethical or
against an industry regulation as a way of protecting herself. However, she would still express her
dislike and provide them with an explanation of how it should be done, knowing that management
would simply ignore her.
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Another participant who is also early in her career explained a similar approach that she
adopted:
The whole CYA thing, like the fact that I feel I need to do that for
myself and my own job…so I can point the finger and say, “I didn’t
do this, and I didn’t agree with this,” if it were to come back to me.
These similar experiences were described by all the participants and were developed very early in
their careers. Many of the more experienced participants continue this practice into their present
roles, although their current organizations do not have the same unethical security culture that they
experienced early in their security career.
IV.2.4

Self-education

Many participants described actions to educate themselves when faced with a tension. For
example, a participant who was early in his career as a security analyst revealed that management
had demanded that his team reduce the number of security vulnerabilities in the organization’s
systems. The manager hardly cared about how diligently the team was working or how experienced
the team members were but only expressed an interest in the fact that the total numbers were
declining each week. The participant initially felt that his lack of experience was the reason for the
failure and consequently made an effort to educate himself and become an asset to the team. He
immediately realized that his abilities were not the reason for the failure; nevertheless, he
continued to educate himself so that he could explain to the manager the cause of the failure in an
attempt to discourage the manager from demanding the alteration of security reports to show his
preferred yet fabricated numbers.
An experienced participant described the actions she had undertaken early in her career to
self-educate after being denied access to training required to perform her job. She stated that when
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she would neither get the help that she needed nor receive the requisite training, she resorted to
obtaining the training on her own and educate herself to effectively perform her job. At the time,
her role was to generate security reports, and being denied the necessary training affected her
reporting ability.
Another experienced participant recounted how in her first security role she lacked
experience in the security field and simply followed orders. As she began to self-study for an
industry certification, she began to realize that her organization was making her perform tasks in
a way that violated the industry standards and often regulatory requirements. This realization
motivated her to learn as much and as quickly as she could.
I obtained my certification after four months [of self-study]. I was
able to do so because that type of mentality that [the organization]
had really pushed me to want to prove them wrong…especially [in
terms of] interpreting the standard…more so than anything because
they would say, “you don’t know what we’ve been doing for years,
so you don’t really understand the interpretation.” I worked really
hard to understand and learn the ins and outs [of my job].
The participant’s awareness of her being instructed to perform unethically drove her to learn and
to try and educate the organization on its failings. She later realized that she would be unable to
change the organization but that she could be an example of how the job should be done correctly.
With regard to her first role, a participant in the lower experience group revealed that she
realized beforehand that she did not want to remain in the role; nonetheless, she disliked the idea
of letting her résumé “suffer” by changing out of her role too early. Instead she elected to stay for
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a year and learn all she could to make herself more marketable for a future position at another
organization.
IV.2.5

Repressing the Tension

Several participants acknowledged undertaking resolution actions to repress the tensions
that they were forced to handle. This move typically occurred after one or more attempts to resolve
the tension had failed or after a previous resolution action had created a new tension that they were
then compelled to confront. In describing his time as a security manager, an experienced
participant realized that his efforts to make changes in the organization had failed and he had lost
the support of leadership. He had to adopt a “self-preservation” mode until he could find a new
job.
I was an extravert when I was in the military. I was always out there
in front, always leading, always involved. [However,] with this new
position, the new job, the new attitude I have, I’m a complete
introvert. I never leave my cubicle and I never talk to anybody unless
spoken to first. I don’t attend the social gatherings that the employer
organizes. I don’t socialize either. I just keep to myself and do my
job; I keep my nose clean out of fear of what would happen should
someone view my actions negatively.
This experience demonstrated how the participant progressed toward the complete elimination of
the chance of being forced to deal with any new tensions, as the refusal to speak to anyone unless
forced to is repressing the current tensions.
An experienced participant recalled a similar incident from early in her career at a previous
organization. She stated that she had to keep her paycheck coming in while she gained the
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experience and learned the industry regulations. Although she was aware that the activities were
being conducted incorrectly, she did what she had to until she found an opportunity to leave. In
this example, the participant ignored the tension until she could find another role. She believed
that she could disregard the issue and not have to deal with it long enough to make the tension go
away.
Another experienced participant explained how she coped with the tension of being ignored
by management early on when she would suggest the proper way of conducting activities:
I would reason it out…if I feel that a rationale exists or if [such
activity constitutes a] policy, I cannot change policy. So, I agreed to
what was being expected.
She added that she would repress the tension by deciding to view any tension as most likely being
a policy issue because she knew that she could not make policy changes.
IV.2.6

Forming Tight Subgroups

All the participants described working in teams at some point in their careers. Several
participants mentioned the tensions that their entire team dealt with as the management made
demands that were unethical and, in many instances, in violation of federal regulations. They also
underscored how their teams had come together to form tight bonds as they coped with these
demands. These bonds frequently engendered subgroups that divided themselves from the group,
thus creating tension (i.e., a team of security analysts against the management). An experienced
male participant recalled a case involving a team he was with early in his career:
We somewhat became friends because we went to lunch together on
a regular basis. We dealt with the same problems. [These instances]
somehow made [things] easier than I think they would have been.
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This collective experience allowed the participant to speak with his team members and share his
frustrations over the management’s demands. He mentioned battling the management as the team
members would be forced to rely on each other to keep management off their backs. He also
revealed how they convened informal meetings to decide the necessary steps in making the
management happy. He added that several team members who held industry certifications worried
about being caught altering reports at the behest of management and consequently losing their
certifications. At these informal meetings, the team would discuss the steps they would take should
they be found out.
Another experienced participant who was a security manager and leader of a team of
security analysts at the time recounted a particular incident in which he worked to protect his
subordinates from the upper management who wanted to blame his analysts for the security
reports.
To me, it’s more important that the subordinates don’t get caught in
the crossfire…so, I exert extra [efforts to] take care of them and
protect them from the crossfire, although I do not need to.
This type of protection did not go unnoticed by the security analysts. More than one participant
mentioned the turnover of security analysts due to the conflict between the team and management
or between their manager and upper management.
IV.2.7

Withdrawing from the Tension

All the participants eventually opted to withdraw from the tensions they faced, but not until
after attempting one or more of the previously described resolution actions. The participants
individually recounted their experiences whereby they knew that they could no longer remain at
their organization and subsequently made plans to leave. Only one of the less experienced
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participants, who did not describe the security culture as unethical, withdrew from the tensions
that were not unscrupulous in nature. The remaining participants withdrew from tensions created
by unethical demands and unethical security cultures. In most instances, the participants revealed
that they stayed at their company for a year or more before leaving. However, one experienced
female participant noted her decision to leave after only eight months with the organization
following a major breach in the firm and the firm decided to cover it up.
I informed them all [about the breach]; the CEO [was] sitting in the
same room. I asked, “What’s the notification process?” I was the
information security manager at the time and they replied,
“Communicate? We’re not communicating this.”
She mentioned the CEO’s decision to hide the data breach and refusal to even notify the pertinent
client for fear of losing that client. No matter the arguments that the participant had raised, the
CEO refused to let her issue a breach notification. Realizing that she had no higher management
to notify as the CEO had already made the decision, she decided that same day to leave and gave
a 30-day notice.
Another experienced participant revealed that he could no longer endure management’s
unethical decisions. In a particular instance, he was ordered to remove the fact that an attacker had
been in the network for four months and the organization had proof of this issue; however, to avoid
penalties or fines, the organization decided to remove this information from the report to appear
as though that it had been reported within the required timeframe. He referred to this incident as
the last straw and eventually put in a two-week notice.
A more experienced male participant recalled his decision to leave after remaining with
the organization for exactly two years.
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I was the first one to leave. Within a period of six to eight months,
everybody who was on the security operations side had left. Six to
seven people on leadership positions had left.
This participant was part of a leadership team that had formed a very tight subgroup as they
defended themselves and their subordinates from the upper management’s unethical demands;
after the participant had left, almost the whole leadership team also quit the organization as the
subgroup they had formed began to break up as individuals began leaving the organization.
For a less experienced female participant, she realized that she was altering her security
reports in ways to avoid her overbearing manager and acknowledged that she was demotivated in
her reporting work because of the manager’s excessive demands. She then began looking for a
different role at another organization.
Most of the participants described similar experiences in which they and others around
them recognized their unethical security culture and their efforts to change the culture were failing.
Upon realizing that they could not resolve the tensions, they decided to leave their current unethical
security culture, desiring to engage with a better, ethical, organization.
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DISCUSSION
Information security professionals are expected to act in an ethical manner and to report
security issues to their organizations. Additionally, those with professional certifications have
sworn to engage in ethical behaviors when accepting their certifications. These reports are
expected to be complete and represent an accurate picture of an organization’s needs, as the reports
are used to strengthen the security posture against threats both internal and external to the
organization. However, as this study indicates, these information security professionals must
resolve many drivers of tensions and dealing with these tensions often creates a paradox. Security
professionals must therefore decide between two opposing requirements, which often results in the
security reports being altered or manipulated before being presented to the executive leadership.
This situation also creates a paradox for the organization, that is, the firm must rely on the
information security professional to generate the reports used to secure the organization, but the
security reports are often altered or manipulated to reduce or hide the threats confronting the firm.
The participants described working at both small and large organizations. One experienced
participant described being employed as a security manager at a small organization that employed
25 or fewer people, including the CEO. In this role, she directly interacted with the CEO who
engaged in and ordered the participant to undertake unethical behaviors. The majority of
participants reported working in large organizations, with several organizations employing 10,000
or more employees. The participants employed at larger organizations cited the unethical demands
being made by leadership that was one or two levels above them, with a few participants reporting
unethical demands coming from three levels of leadership above them. In the experiences
described by the participants who were employed at larger organizations, none involved the
unethical demands originating from the executive leadership (i.e., CEO, CFO, or CTO). In larger
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organizations, the unethical behavior was a result of the lower level leadership’s desire to hide
information from the executive leadership team. In one example of this case, a participant
described the VP as attempting to hide the actual results of the security report from the executive
team, fearing that the report results would result in the loss of his job. The participant added that
this VP ordered his director to generate the false report, which resulted in the orders being given
to the security manager and in turn to the individual security professionals. The participant did
share that his VP was eventually discovered to be ordering the alteration of the security reports
and was immediately terminated for his actions. Insufficient evidence was collected to determine
if organizational size was a determining factor in whether security professionals were either
ordered to engage in or chose to perform in unethical behavior. However, the results of the study
indicated that this behavior was experienced in both small and large organizations, suggesting that
the size of the organization was not a factor.
All but one participant held at least one professional certification, and each of those
participants expressed their fear of losing their certifications as a result of their unethical behavior.
Several participants described having conversations with other security professionals with whom
they worked and the actions they would undertake if their unethical behavior was discovered. In
many instances, this driving tension led to resolution actions such as secretly documenting the
unethical demands they were given. Several participants also described coordinated efforts by the
team to protect each other in case of the discovery of one individual’s unethical behavior. Part of
the reason for this is that the discovery of one individual’s unethical behaviors would cast light on
the rest of the team’s unethical behaviors; and in part as a means of assisting in the secret
documentation of the unethical demands from their supervisors to avoid the detection of their
clandestine documenting efforts.
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Although all the participants understood their ethical obligations to properly generate
security reports, regardless of having a professional certification outlining this obligation, they
were individually forced to weigh the outcome of their actions against their ethical obligations.
For instance, when confronted with a choice of either engaging in the unethical behavior being
demanded of them by a supervisor or to refusing these demands because they violated the oath to
undertake ethical behavior, they had to weigh the repercussions of these two choices. As the results
indicated, the choice was most often to engage in the unethical behavior while using one or more
forms of resolution actions such as simply denying the responsibility for their actions or secretly
documenting the unethical demands as a means of justifying their actions. On the one hand, the
individuals have a genuine fear of consequences for refusing the unethical demands, such as
termination; on the other hand, they risk losing their professional certification. Additionally, for
each choice, they must judge the time to consequence and the relative impact on themselves. The
results suggested that the individuals believed that the more immediate consequence of reprisal for
disobedience is often believed to be more certain than the more long-term consequence of
potentially losing their professional certifications.
This study sought to identify the tensions that information security professionals
experience in their reporting efforts and the actions they undertake to resolve those tensions. In
this study, literal replication logic was used for gathering similar experiences from information
security professionals, whereas theoretical replication logic was employed to ascertain if four
different groups separated by experience and gender had diverse experiences that affected their
information security reporting. Different experiences were described between the male and female
participants, but these variances were limited to interactions between the two genders, indicative
of gender bias or pay inequality. No evidence supported either of these differences between males
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and females as having an effect on the accuracy of information security reporting. As such, this
study did not find evidence to suggest that gender plays an important role in the accuracy of the
information security reports generated.
Similar to gender, experience was not demonstrated to create significantly different
reporting practices with the more experienced participants describing similar tensions as the
inexperienced participants. This result underscores the common experiences by information
security professionals as they progress in their careers. However, an exception in this case is the
coercion described by the more experienced participants. This outcome is understandable as the
less experienced security professionals are not expected to have the knowledge and experience
required to refuse many of the unethical demands this study has described. Hence, the less
experienced security professionals are more likely to comply with their leadership’s demands even
when those demands are considered unethical. On the contrary, the more experienced participants
indicated a higher level of coercion used by their leadership, which engendered unethical behaviors
under duress.
V.1

Paradoxical Tensions
In the participants’ depictions of their experiences, several common themes emerged as

drivers of tensions that they faced in their roles. These tensions were latent, existing inherently in
the roles that the participants held or as they engaged in security reporting, and such tensions
remained latent until they surfaced in specific information security reporting situations, at which
point they became salient and needed to be resolved in one form or another by the security
professional. These tensions do not resolve themselves but instead force the security professionals
to reflect back on the tension as they act to resolve them, often creating a new tension to be
addressed (Lewis, 2000; Putnam et al., 2016). Given this recurring evolution of a tension into a
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new tension, security professionals engage in two or more resolution steps as they attempt to
resolve the tensions. This case is especially true for security professionals as they encounter
paradoxical tensions, whereby they are given unethical demands or realize they are in an unethical
culture.
Unethical Security Culture
An unethical security culture is a culture where unethical practices have become common.
These unethical practices are typically the result of prolonged unethical demands from the leaders
as they attempt to hide information from the executive leadership of the organization. Nonetheless,
this situation is not always true, as small organizations with poor or unethical security cultures
often include the executive leaders who engage in making the unethical demands. For smaller
organizations, this outcome often emanates from the executive leaders’ desire to grow their
business; furthermore, these executive leaders are willing to engage in unethical practices to
achieve this goal. For larger organizations, these unethical demands stem from the lower to middle
management’s fear of looking bad to the executive leadership. These managers frequently demand
that security reports be altered by their subordinates, fearing that the authentic results will in some
way cause them to lose their jobs should the executives learn of the unaltered results. These
unethical demands, once they become salient, subsequently develop into a paradoxical tension for
the information security professional as they must now choose between two or more competing
demands.
Information security professionals who engage in information security reporting do so
against the backdrop that they undertake a practice that is intended to discover information security
issues, and these issues are then reported to the organization to help with mitigating or remediating
these security issues. Security-related issues cover a broad spectrum of threats to an organization,
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which originate from internal and external sources and can be malicious or accidental. These same
security professionals are expected to be ethical in their efforts, and they count on their
organizations to foster an ethical security culture. However, as this study indicates, information
security professionals often join organizations that appear to be ethical at first, but they quickly
realize that they have entered into an unethical security culture as they are given demands that
contradict or violate the organization’s security policies, regulatory requirements, or industry
standards. This situation creates a paradox as they are confronted with contradictory requirements
(Lewis, 2000), that is, complying with their leadership’s unethical demands or maintaining the
policy requisites or industry standards they are being told to violate. This unethical security culture
is frequently driven by leadership’s desire to hide security information from the executive leaders.
This concealment of information from the executive leaders often creates an unethical security
culture that becomes undiscovered, as the unethical practices are used to hide this security culture
from the executives. However, the study denotes that at times, such as within a small organization,
the CEO is also responsible for this unethical security culture. Over time, as the leadership
continues to make unethical demands of the security professionals, these unethical practices
become common and the individual security professionals begin to engage in unethical practices,
knowing that the practice is what is expected from their leadership. As this situation persists, the
entire security culture becomes characterized by corrupt practices, which would require a major
effort to correct. In resolving this tension, security professionals must deal with multiple
paradoxical tensions, including the following: Should they comply with the unethical demands of
their superior or maintain their ethical obligation and thus increase their chance to be terminated?
Should they violate the ethical requirements of their professional certifications or engage in the
unethical demands of their superior? Depending on their industry, security professionals may even
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be faced with the paradox of engaging in the demand to alter reports that are used for achieving
industry or regulatory certification or risking termination by notifying regulators about the
unethical demands and unethical practices within the organization.
Fear of Looking Bad
Although a poor or unethical security culture is an overall culture issue that is due to
unscrupulous practices that have become common from the prolonged unethical demands of
leadership, the fear of looking bad is the most common driver that engenders these unethical
demands. The leadership’s fear of looking bad to the executives frequently stems from the security
report showing a large number of findings. This trepidation drives the leadership to engage in the
unethical practice of altering or manipulating the security reports prior to the reports being sent to
the executive leadership. As attribution theory explains, individuals perceive their relationship
between the cause of an issue and the outcome of that issue, with issues being either internal or
external to those individuals (Munton et al., 1999; Park et al., 2008). This inference is evident in a
case where the leaders fear that the report will have a negative effect on them directly and engage
in unethical behaviors or order their subordinates to perform unscrupulous behaviors by altering
the security reports. This fear of looking bad is not limited to the security leadership, but it can
also exist between the stakeholders with whom the security professionals interact, as the
stakeholders dread the effect that the security reports will have on them or their business unit. This
situation creates a performance paradox where tension occurs between stakeholders with
conflicting demands (Smith & Lewis, 2011). This tension is experienced as the information
security professional must generate a security report using information provided by the
stakeholder; however, the stakeholder’s fear often results in the alteration of information, refusal
to provide information, or attempts to convincing the security professional to avoid proper
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reporting. The mum effect, which employs attribution theory as its theoretical background,
indicates that two factors influence an individual’s desire to report bad news. These factors are
time effect and fault responsibility (Park et al., 2008). As the current study shows, security
professionals often get the sense that a stakeholder is withholding information or has provided
false information in an attempt to reduce the effect the security report will have on them. This case
demonstrates fault responsibility; the more the stakeholders view themselves as not being at fault
for the information they provide, the more likely they are to provide the information (Park et al.,
2008). Stakeholders frequently wait until the end of a security audit or near the end of a deadline
before providing the required information to the security professional. This situation illustrates an
example of the time effect, whereby the stakeholders are less likely to provide the information if
they perceive they have time to wait before they must provide it (Park et al., 2008). Both of these
factors employed by stakeholders become tensions that the security professional must deal with
and are often sensed by the latter. Such contradictory sense or feeling transforms the tension into
a paradox (Lewis, 2000). As security professionals must contend with the often mixed messages
they receive from the stakeholders (Lewis, 2000; Putnam, 1986), they are then confronted with the
paradoxical tension of reporting the information they were provided while ignoring their feeling
of accepting inaccurate information, or attempting to verify whether the feeling is genuine.
Security professionals also experience this paradoxical tension as they are given demands by their
leaders whose goal is to attract or retain future business with their client, whereas the client’s goal
is to obtain a certification. The client and the organization’s leader are engaged in two different
goals, thereby creating a performing paradox (Smith & Lewis, 2011) that exists between the two
organizations, and placing the security professionals between the two parties; furthermore, security
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professionals experience a third and different paradox of meeting their employer’s demands or
writing an accurate report.
Tight Deadlines or Scoping Issues
Tight deadlines and scoping issues are not uncommon in business. Budgetary constraints
and lack of proper planning are two common reasons for tight deadlines with scoping issues, which
are typically related to a general lack of knowledge prior to an engagement starting. For example,
the number of security findings prior to the beginning of an engagement would be impossible to
determine, and the scoping would have to be set using prior knowledge of similar engagements.
However, once a scan is completed and far more findings are generated, the engagement is no
longer scoped properly. This factor can have a negative effect on the accuracy of a security report,
as the information security professional must now deal with this scoping issue. Tight deadlines
and scoping issues often create paradoxical tensions for information security professionals, and in
resolving these tensions, often produces new ones (Lewis, 2000). This case is demonstrated in the
results of the current study, as participants who are engaged as security consultants are responsible
for generating a security report within a specified time limit before the true scope of the
engagement is realized. As security professionals engage in the assessment, they realize that far
more security issues were found than were expected and would take much longer to validate and
report than was provided for in the scope of the engagement. The security professionals are then
confronted with an either/or decision as a paradoxical tension. If the security professionals choose
to get the report properly validated and reported, their free time will be required, as they must work
off the clock on their own time to meet the deadline. Otherwise, they can opt to validate as much
as possible and generate a report that is inaccurate but is reflective of what they could do in the
time they were provided. The two choices are a paradox because neither alternative offers a
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positive outcome for the individual. As the study indicates, many security professionals make the
choice to work on their own time to meet the deadline, which results in a new tension that they
must deal with, consequently confronting them with potential health and relationship issues as they
work to meet the deadline. For those security professionals who elect to submit a report that only
shows what they had time to validate and does not cover the entire list of security issues found,
they are now faced with the knowledge that the organization may not be asked to return in the
future by that client. However, they did not sacrifice their own time in order to meet the poorly
scoped deadline. This case is another example of a paradox created by contradictory demands
(Lewis, 2000), as the security professionals had to decide between creating a fully accurate report
and sacrificing their personal time to meet the deadline, or producing an incomplete report without
sacrificing their personal time. This decision can be a very difficult one for security professionals
with other obligations on their personal time, such as families, second jobs, and other external
activities (e.g., volunteer work).
Lack of Experience or Knowledge
Lack of experience or knowledge is associated with stakeholders in the security teams and
those stakeholders with whom they interact. It is primarily related to new security leaders with
inadequate experience in managing a security team, but it can also be related to new security
professionals who have recently entered the security field. Furthermore, lack of knowledge is
associated with the stakeholders with whom the information security professionals must interact,
including internal and external stakeholders. For new security leaders, security professionals
confront this tension when working with inexperienced leaders, and such tension is often driven
by the leaders’ demands for the security professionals to engage in actions with which the latter
does not agree. When leaders are new, they frequently adopt a conservative approach and set
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demands or standards that may not be in the best interest of the client or the organization, but this
approach is expected to be a safer one. Security professionals are faced with the paradox of
deciding between doing what they are instructed to do despite their belief that it is not the best
action, or defying the instructions and doing what they feel is best for the client or the organization.
The security professional is confronted with the absurd and irrational existence of opposites that
can simultaneously exist, whereby either choice is both right and wrong (Lewis, 2000). In ignoring
their leader, security professionals believe that they are acting in the best interest of the client yet
resisting their leader’s instructions; by contrast, following the leader’s instructions is required, but
it may not be in the best interest of the client or the organization. In these examples, security
professionals may possibly be both right and wrong regardless of their choice.
Another issue related to a lack of knowledge emerges when the security professional is
expected to generate a security report but must also deal with obtaining information needed from
stakeholders who do not know how to provide it. Security professionals must then decide between
attempting to gather the information another way or reporting that the information was unavailable.
This either/or decision creates the paradoxical tension (Lewis, 2000), and security professionals
often resolve this tension based on how tight a deadline they are facing. When dealing with a
stakeholder directly and in person, security professionals can often assist the stakeholder
depending on the latter’s willingness to be assisted; however, this case becomes more complicated
if the stakeholder is only interacted with via email or phone conversation.
Perceptions of Security
Oftentimes information security professionals must deal with the stakeholders’ perception
of security as a roadblock or that they are perceived as being too demanding, and these perceptions
affect how stakeholders interact with security professionals. As the study indicates, some
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stakeholders attempt to bypass security professionals, thus reducing the security professional’s
ability to engage in their reporting efforts. As previously mentioned, the stakeholders’ fear of the
effects that a security report will have on them triggers a conflict between the stakeholder and the
security professional, creating a performing paradox where tension occurs between stakeholders
with conflicting demands (Smith & Lewis, 2011). An example of this paradoxical tension is an
information security professional who must generate a report of the vulnerabilities in an
application being developed for use by the organization. The security professional has a mandate
to provide as accurate a report as possible, and the needs of the business unit are disregarded in
this report. The business unit leader who is responsible for the development of this application has
to meet a deadline that is set by their leadership. The business unit leader knows that any security
findings in the security report will cause a delay in the final delivery of this application. As the
two work for the same organization, a frequent assumption is that they are endeavoring toward the
same goal; however, in reality, they have competing demands that further increase as the deadline
looms for the business unit leader. As the deadline gets closer and security issues continue to be
found by the security professionals, the more likely the business leader will view the security
professional as a roadblock. For those business unit leaders who have already experienced this
situation, they will engage with the security professionals from the outset, with the perception of
security as an obstacle. For security professionals, they are simply doing their job of reporting the
security issues in the application, but now they must also deal with the behaviors of the business
unit leader who often will launch attempts at manipulating the information that is provided to the
security professional. For the more experienced security professionals who are engaged in a
leadership role, they will undergo a similar tension but for a different reason, as their security
department falls under the same executive leadership of the CTO as the business units they are
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responsible for providing security reports to. These leaders must compete against each other for
budget and resources but with very different goals to achieve. As that budget is allocated by the
CTO, it will often create conflict between the departments, further enhancing the negative views
of security.
Team Politics
Team politics pertain to the behaviors exhibited by individuals as they interact with other
team members, as very few information security roles involve working alone. This situation is
demonstrated in the study, as all the participants have worked in a team setting during their careers.
Except for one participant, all the participants continue to have roles as part of a team. The more
experienced participants often progressed from being in a team member role to a supervisor role,
with one participant having started his own information security consulting company. As the
owner of his own company, this participant often hires contract personnel, subsequently assuming
the role of a team leader. Teams are predominant in the information security field; hence, the fact
that many teams are forced to deal with team politics is not surprising. However, dealing with team
politics is also deemed to influence security reporting. The study indicates that some information
security professionals intentionally alter security reports in an attempt to sabotage their supervisors
or deny access to other security professionals who request access to training or documentation
required to write a security report.
These actions generate a performing paradox (Smith & Lewis, 2011), whereby security
professionals are expected to create an accurate security report, but they decide to perform
unethically in an attempt to discredit their manager. The paradox is not experienced by security
professionals engaged in the unethical behavior but by the security manager and other security
professionals on the team as they learn about the unethical behavior. Once the issue is resolved,
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they are now confronted with a changed world where they can no longer trust this security
professional to act ethically. Security managers must choose between continuing to lead their team
as before assuming the incident was a unique occurrence or changing the way they manage in an
attempt to prevent the situation from recurring. Team politics do not always involve unethical
behavior; in fact, it is often demonstrated by team members who neglect their duties, causing other
team members to shoulder the additional burden. As a result, these other team members have less
time to perform their own tasks, which can affect the security reports.
Coercion
Coercion is more than simply making a demand of security professionals; it involves
threatening the individual or others as a means of forcing security professionals to engage in
behaviors they would not otherwise engage in. Information security professionals are often
confronted with coercion; the less experienced security professionals experience milder forms of
coercion, such as stakeholders’ attempt to convince the security professional to alter a report by
adding some form of fear (i.e., being afraid that they would lose their job if the security
professional were to submit their reports as it is). The more experienced security professionals
become, and as their role moves into a leadership role, the coercion becomes more pronounced
and often involves threats to others. As the study indicates, security professionals are often willing
to defy the unethical demands when the threat is individually directed to them; however, when the
coercion involves threats to others, security professionals are inclined to engage in unethical
behavior, as their leadership is demanding. The paradoxical tension is a choice between complying
with organizational policies, regulatory requirements, and industry regulations, which presents a
potential to cost others their jobs, or conforming to the unethical demands being set by the security
leadership. The paradox that security professionals confront is exaggerated by the knowledge that
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others are now being influenced by the outcome of their decision. Described in the section on
improving information security compliance, the use of the neutralization technique of “defense of
necessity” is employed by individuals to rationalize their deviant behavior whenever necessary.
However, similar to all seven of the neutralization techniques, the defense of necessity is a selfrealized rationalization, and its use does not involve outside individuals. Neutralization techniques
may be employed by individuals to rationalize their deviant behavior; nevertheless, this
rationalization is a purely internal mechanism adopted by the will of the individuals on themselves,
and it is not forced upon them by an outside actor. As this study demonstrates, security
professionals who are forced to confront coercive actions involving a threat to others are obliged
to act under duress. Duress is a legal term that is heavily contested in the criminal justice field as
either being no different from the defense of necessity or being a unique defense that a reasonable
person would be unable to resist and should be understood as being situational and not dependent
on the threat being manmade or natural (Westen & Mangiafico, 2004). In his article titled
“Techniques of Neutralization: A Reconceptualization and Empirical Examination,” W. William
Minor conceptualized the seventh neutralization technique that he referred to as the “defense of
necessity;” this technique denotes that if the security professionals perceive the unethical behavior
as necessary, then they need not feel guilty of this moral conflict (Minor, 1981). This concept is in
holding with the conservative criminal justice belief that a defense of necessity should be the same
for a man-made threat as it is for a natural threat such as being obliged to take action that would
otherwise be illegal as a means to prevent an even more egregious illegal act. By contrast, the
liberal conservative view argues that the Model Penal Code suggests that individuals should be
afforded a defense to threats that they would be unable to resist (Westen & Mangiafico, 2004).
This liberal view is supported by the Model Penal Code Section 2.09. Duress, which clearly states
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that an actor has an affirmative defense when engaged in conduct that would be an offense because
he was coerced to do so by the use of force or the threat of force against himself or against another
and this person was of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist (Model
Penal Code, Sec. 2.09(1)). Arguably, information security professionals should be considered as
persons of reasonable firmness in their situation, given their overriding obligation to defend against
the highly deviant behavior in which they must engage. However, security professionals who
perform unethical behavior under duress have not necessarily compromised their status as
responsible individuals, but this understanding does challenge if the security professionals are
responsible for the unethical act (Brink, 2018). Furthermore, the security professionals’
justification in their actions is not simply a matter of social reality but is solely an issue of their
beliefs (Fletcher, 1998). Much of the current understanding of behavioral information security is
derived from the criminal justice field; hence, a reasonable argument is that a discussion should
begin among scholars in the behavioral information security field of the separation between
Minor’s “defense of necessity” and the malicious behavior under duress. As previously explained,
there is support among criminal justice scholars and the Model Penal Code for this new category
of neutralization technique.
V.2

Resolution Actions

Similar to how information security professionals often deal with more than one tension at a time,
they also frequently engage in multiple resolution actions simultaneously as they attempt to resolve
one or more tensions. Additionally, many resolution actions are used for different tensions
confronting information security professionals (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3:
Mapping of resolution actions to paradoxical tension

Drivers of Tensions

Resolution Actions

Unethical security culture

Attempts to change the organization
Denying responsibility
Self-protection
Forming tight subgroups
Repressing the tension
Withdrawing from the tension

Fear of looking bad

Denying responsibility
Self-protection

Tight deadlines or scoping issues

Denying responsibility
Forming tight subgroups

Lack of experience or knowledge

Self-education
Denying responsibility

Perceptions of security

Forming tight subgroups
Attempts to change the organization

Team politics

Forming tight subgroups
Self-education

Coercion

Repressing the tension
Self-protection
Withdrawing from the tension

Denying Responsibility
As information security professionals attempt to confront the tensions associated with a
poor or unethical security culture, a fear of looking bad, tight deadlines and scoping issues, or the
lack of experience or knowledge, they often choose to deny responsibility for their unethical
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behavior in altering a security report. This resolution action was commonly undertaken by the less
experienced security professionals in this study. Security professionals rationalize their actions as
being the responsibility of their leadership; moreover, they assert that their actions are forced on
them, which constitutes a neutralization technique referred to as the “denial of responsibility”
(Sykes & Matza, 1957). This assertion of responsibility is frequently accurate, as the less
experienced security professionals lack the experience or knowledge required to act against their
leadership’s unethical demands. In the current study, the less experienced security professionals
without one or more professional certifications primarily adopted this resolution technique, doing
so with little to no additional coercion required from their leadership. By contrast, the more
experienced security professionals similarly described the use of this resolution technique early in
their careers; however, as they gained experience, they began to refuse engaging in the unethical
behaviors that their leaders had demanded of them. The difference between the experienced and
inexperienced security professionals suggests that over time, as experience is gained, security
professionals are less likely to perform unethical behavior even when confronted with the demand.
This knowledge becomes important for security professionals who are early in their careers
because they are more likely to be hired by organizations with poor security cultures as they
attempt to gain experience with firms that know they can pay less for this lack of experience.
Attempts to Change the Organization
Attempts to change the organization were made as resolution actions when dealing with
the paradoxical tensions for an unethical security culture and the perceptions of security that
security professionals must deal with. Both security professionals having less experience and the
ones with more experience described attempts to change the organization after realizing they were
in an unethical security culture or were having unethical demands placed on them by their
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leadership. Such efforts to resolve a persistent tension were largely employed by the more
experienced security professionals, whereas several of the less experienced professionals made
similar attempts but to a lesser degree. This finding suggests that as security professionals gain
experience, they are more likely to engage in creating an ethical security culture. When dealing
with the other stakeholders’ perceptions of security professionals as a roadblock or as excessively
demanding, the more experienced security professionals would undertake efforts to change those
perception by directly engaging the stakeholders to highlight their department’s demands in an
attempt to demonstrate that their actions were in alignment with the business unit leadership. The
more experienced participants would frequently describe efforts to work with the stakeholders to
help them to achieve their own goals. In one example of this case, an experienced security manager
advised that he would offer to allow some middle ground to be attained, thereby permitting the
business unit to continuously function while resolving the remaining issues. This effort was not
strictly in keeping with a security policy, but it served to alter the perception of security as a
roadblock. The less experienced participants demonstrated attempts to change the organization by
advising the leadership about the regulations and how the organization was failing to meet those
regulations. Such counsel would frequently fall on deaf ears, and the security professional would
then engage in whatever behavior was being demanded. This incident demonstrates that even early
in their careers, most security professionals make attempts to change their organizations for the
better.
Self-protection
This resolution action is undertaken when security professionals are confronted by several
paradoxical tensions, including an unethical security culture, fear of looking bad, and coercion.
When faced with the realization that their organization or leaders are engaging in unethical
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behaviors, security professionals begin to take actions designed to protect themselves in the event
that their actions are discovered. This case is typically illustrated in the security professionals’
decision to keep notes or documentation that provides evidence of their unwillingness to
participate in the unethical behavior that is being demanded of them. Many security professionals
conceal these notes from their leadership, depending on the level of fear they have for the potential
repercussions of being discovered. Security professionals who are new to their careers often
request their leaders to confirm their demands via an email as a means of recording their
leaderships orders that they have deemed to be unethical. The severity of the unethical demand
dictates the type of documentation that the security professional uses. In an example of this case,
a manager orders a security analyst to decrease the severity of a finding without having a justifiable
reason for doing so. The security analysts frequently request a confirmation of the instructions to
save as proof that the reduction of the severity level is at the manager’s behest and that they are
not acting on their own. A more severe example of this situation involves a security manager who
orders to alter a security report to remove issues and eventually reduce the report’s impact. The
security manager typically keeps the original report and sends the altered report as instructed.
Keeping the original document then serves as proof that the security professionals created an
honest report yet were ordered to alter or manipulate the data in the final report. Whatever the
means used, security professionals at all levels of experience engage in self-protection when
confronted with unethical demands. This resolution type is a delayed form of projecting where
should the unethical behavior become known, the security professionals then expects they can use
this evidence of their reluctance to shift the blame to another responsible party (Lewis, 2000;
Putnam et al, 2016).

100

Self-education
When faced with a paradoxical tension related to the lack of experience or team politics,
security professionals often engage in self-education to resolve these tensions. When security
professionals experience a tension that is designed to block them from completing their job such
as being blocked from training or from documentation that will assist them in their reporting
responsibilities, they frequently resolve this tension by self-educating. This resolution technique
is a form of repression, whereby security professionals choose not to directly engage in resolving
the tension and instead ignore it by educating themselves in their own time (Jarzabkowski & Lê,
2016). In the current study, this move was more often described as a resolution action undertaken
by the less experienced security professionals and was generally related to their fear of their
inexperience, causing their fellow team members to suffer management’s anger at not meeting
certain demands. When security professionals are new to the industry, they normally realize that
their formal education has not taught them what they need to perform their job function, or that
they need to achieve a professional certification if they intend to advance in their careers.
Oftentimes organizations do not offer additional assistance in this area, and security professionals
must rely on themselves to achieve their goals. When team politics are the source of tension,
security professionals must work outside of the team and often outside of the organization to gain
the knowledge they require to perform their responsibilities. As the security field is a constantly
changing space, most information security professionals tend to be self-educators; when
confronted with these two tensions early in their careers, many quickly move to self-educate.
Forming Tight Subgroups
Security professionals working in a team typically have shared experiences. They may
individually experience unethical demands but working as a team facilitates the sharing of the
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stress that these demands induce. As a result, a resolution type known as splitting transpires, in
which the team becomes a subgroup that forms a we/them distinction as the team members attempt
to deal with management’s demands, thus creating a distinct social divide (Lewis, 2000; Smith &
Berg, 1997). The group frequently engages in social activities such as going to lunch or having
drinks together, and the members exclude the leadership from these events. Furthermore, security
professionals in the group often engage in informal discussions related to the unethical practices
that their leaders are demanding of them and how those demands may affect their professional
certifications. As a group, security professionals discuss resolution actions such as self-protection
and they begin documenting their leadership’s unethical demands. Instead of acting as individuals
attempting to make change in the organization, the group acts in a concerted manner and discusses
its efforts. In this way, each individual security professional will not attempt resolution actions,
but every member of the group will undertake a different resolution action and the remaining
members will accept the result for the group. As a group, security professionals act to protect each
other against their leadership. This approach is particularly effective as the team documents the
unethical demands of each group member, preventing their leadership from discovering their
documenting actions. When the group includes a supervisor such as a team lead or manager, the
documentation typically resides with this individual as the informal leader of the tight subgroup.
Repressing and Withdrawing from the Tension
When security professionals attempt to resolve the paradoxical tensions, including working
in an unethical security culture or coercion through other means such as attempting to change the
security culture of the organization, and those attempts have failed, they generally engage in two
resolutions actions simultaneously. First, they repress the tension by ignoring or denying the
existence of the paradoxical tension (Jarzabkowski & Lê, 2016). This resolution action is used as
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a short-term solution as they attempt to withdraw from the tensions that they were unable to
resolve. Security professionals go into a survival mode where they have given up and are simply
trying to do enough not to be noticed. They then lose all the respect for their leadership and often
for the company. Security professionals repress the tensions, believing that any additional efforts
to resolve the tension will fail. At this point, security professionals have decided that no other
alternatives to resolve the tensions are available and thus begin seeking employment at another
organization. When this situation involves security professionals who are part of a tight subgroup,
their departure is usually followed closely by others from the same subgroup as the support
network starts to break up. This event is an important one for upper management to take note of
because it may verify that an unethical security culture exists within the organization, which needs
to be resolved. If the security professionals are unable to find another role at another organization,
they continue to repress the tensions until they are able to withdraw from the organization. As time
passes, these security professionals become more withdrawn from coworkers and reduce their
interaction with their leadership.
V.3

Conclusions
Information security professionals are not exempt from acting in an unethical manner as it

relates to information security reporting. These unethical practices, regardless of their origin,
create a paradox for the organization that must rely on these security reports. Even the ethical or
conduct requirements of the professional certifications do not prevent security professionals from
engaging in unethical behavior despite fearing the consequences of losing their certifications or
long-term career aspirations.
In the subsequent sections, the drivers of tensions that information security professionals
experience and the resolutions actions they use for resolving those tensions that lead to dealing
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with paradoxical tensions, are described. The contributions of this study to practice and to theory
as well as the study limitations and suggestions for future research are also presented.
Drivers of Tensions
Security professionals encounter and need to resolve several drivers of tensions; in
resolving these tensions, they are then forced to resolve another tension triggered by the resolution
actions of the original tension (Lewis, 2000; Putnam et al, 2016). As the present study indicates,
the action of dealing with a driver of tension frequently creates a paradoxical tension, whereby the
information security professional must decide between two or more competing obligations. This
study provides evidence that despite the best intention of information security professionals, the
security reports they generate may not be as accurate as expected and are often intentionally
altered. Regardless of the reason for altering the report, normally it does not represent the true
security picture to the executive leadership. This situation poses a problem for the organization’s
leaders who are often unaware of the unethical practices occurring in their security department;
furthermore, most of the unethical practices are being demanded by senior and middle managers
who ensure that the executive leadership is kept unaware of such practices. Notably, unethical
practices are not universal to every organization. In this study, the more experienced security
professionals described their departure from organizations that engaged in unethical practices and
in time managed to find an organization that upholds an ethical security culture. Once these
security professionals find an ethical organization, they typically remain with that organization
much longer than they did at previous unethical organizations. This turnover, especially of security
managers, may be a signal to executive leaders that they have a poor or unethical security culture
that needs to be eliminated and fixed.
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Resolution Actions
As security professionals resolve the paradoxical tensions they encounter, they engage in
a number of resolution techniques, often moving from one to another as the tension is resolved and
a new tension emerges (Lewis, 2000; Putnam et al, 2016). The progression of resolution steps that
the information security professional adopts usually depends on the level of experience the security
professional has at the time. The less experienced security professionals often simply deny their
responsibility by shifting any blame for their unethical behavior to their immediate leadership who
gave the order to engage in this behavior. As security professionals gain experience, they begin to
refuse these unethical demands and attempt to make changes to their organization to transform the
security culture from an unethical to an ethical one. They frequently initiate the secret
documentation of the unethical demands and practices that they take part in or observe. They also
often engage an outside party such as HR or the internal audit teams; however, this approach
oftentimes does nothing to stop or change the behaviors. Even when a method of anonymous
reporting of this unethical behavior is available, security professionals fear their participation in
the unethical practices because they likewise engage in them at the leadership’s behest. Moreover,
despite the team of security professionals’ establishment of a tight group as a coping mechanism,
the eventual departure of one member leads to the departure of most if not all of the remaining
members. For the executive leadership, this factor may also be a useful indicator of a poor or
unethical security culture. When the majority of a security team leave over a brief period, the
leadership should recognize this occurrence as a red flag of a problem that the middle management
may be hiding.
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V.4

Contribution to Practice
As this study indicates, many reasons underlie a security professional’s alteration of a

security report. From an organizational viewpoint, the information security professional is
expected to act in an ethical manner and in the best interest of the organization. However, this
study has highlighted seven drivers of tensions that lead to the altering of security reports by
security professionals. By considering these drivers of tensions and the resolution actions, an
organization can initiate efforts to mitigate these tensions and thus reduce the likelihood of security
reports being altered. An example of this case is the mass departure of security staff. As the study
shows, security professionals who are forced to engage in unethical behavior often form tight
subgroups that serve to protect the group against the leadership making the unethical demands.
When one member of the subgroup chooses to leave the organization, the remaining members
normally leave soon after as the protection that the subgroup created has been reduced. This mass
exodus of a security team should raise a red flag for the executive leadership because the incident
may imply that all resolution efforts have been exhausted by the security professionals and the
final resolution attempt is to remove the tension by leaving the organization.
The fear of looking bad is not uncommon for most organizations as the most typical method
of managing is failure intolerance. In other words, individuals fear failing because of the potential
repercussions of failure. In this study, several participants explained that unethical demands were
given by their leaders because of the latter’s fear of being viewed as having failed. As it relates to
a security organization or a business unit, a failure-tolerant culture may be more appropriate to
avoid the fear of failure leading to unethical behaviors. In a failure-tolerant environment, leaders
are allowed to fail, with the understanding that failure will increase the understanding of why they
failed, thus resulting in the avoidance of the same failure in the future. Many of the experiences
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and the resulting drivers of tensions described by the participants could have been significantly
reduced or even eliminated by a failure-tolerant environment.
Numerous companies have adopted an open-door or an anonymous reporting policy
designed to encourage personnel to report unethical behaviors or demands to the organization. As
the study indicates, these policies and practices do not work. One participant was accused of having
reported a violation that was supposedly anonymous. Although the individual did not make the
report, the incident clearly demonstrated to him that nothing was truly anonymous; furthermore,
he realized that had he decided to file a report of the unethical demands, this action would result
in termination. Several other participants described fears related to the reporting of ethical
violations because they would be included with those who were making the unethical demands.
Even when secretly documenting the unethical demands and ethical violations, the participants did
not report the issue to the organization or regulatory bodies for fear of being associated with those
engaged in the unethical behavior. A possible solution to this dilemma is to include a middle agent
in the reporting effort. An example would be to engage a professional certification organization to
submit the ethical violation. The certification organization could then report the violation to a
regulatory body or governmental agency for investigation, allowing for the protection of the
individual. Regardless of the mechanism for reporting these issues, the current method is neither
effective nor capable of reducing the unethical demands and behaviors noted in this study.
V.5

Contribution to Theory
Organizations rely on information security professionals to identify and report on the

security issues that need to be mitigated or remediated to acceptable levels and thus strengthen the
organization’s security posture. These information security professionals are expected to conduct
themselves in an ethical manner as they endeavor to combat the accidental and often intentional
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security threats that can be internal or external to their organizations. Their efforts are normally
driven by industry and regulatory requirements such as the regulatory requisites to protect the
personal health information of patients or the credit card information of consumers. The primary
means of determining the effectiveness of these security efforts is the security report that is
generated by information security professionals themselves. This study provides evidence that a
paradox exists in the creation of these security reports. The paradox is that the very security
professionals an organization relies on to protect and report on the effectiveness of the security
efforts are often manipulating the security reports they create to prevent the real security
effectiveness from being shown to the executive leadership. Information security professionals do
not desire to alter or manipulate the security reports they generate, but they are frequently ordered
to do so by their leadership. As a result, they must resolve the ensuing paradoxical tension that in
turn creates a paradox for the organization, as it must rely on these reports to protect against the
threats that it faces.
This paper contributes to paradox theory by demonstrating the paradoxical tensions that
information security professionals must deal with as they engage in security reporting and the
resolution actions used in addressing these paradoxical tensions. In doing so, this paper contributes
to behavioral information security in two areas. First, it adds to the understanding of the difference
between insider deviant behavior and insider misbehavior, which serves to improve information
security compliance by highlighting the unethical behaviors engaged in by information security
professionals, to include the causes of this unethical behavior and the resolution steps that the
security professionals undertake. Second, the study presents a conceptualization of a new category
of neutralization technique used by information security professionals in resolving paradoxical
tensions as insiders who perform deviant behavior under duress.
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Distinguishing Between Insider Deviant Behavior and Insider Misbehavior
As this study has indicated, information security professionals understand their roles and
the ethical requirements for accurate security reporting. However, they often engage in the
unethical practice of altering or manipulating security reports that are given to the executive
leadership. Although information security professionals intentionally engage in this unethical
practice, they frequently do so at the behest of their leaders, thereby creating a paradox as they are
confronted with contradictory demands (Lewis, 2000).
The present study identifies seven tensions that security professionals often deal with,
which engender unethical practices when generating security reports. These tensions are poor or
unethical security cultures, fear of looking bad, tight deadlines or scoping issues, lack of
experience or knowledge, perceptions of security, team politics, and coercion. A security
professional normally deals with more than one of these tensions simultaneously, and these
tensions are oftentimes the driving force that leads to the manipulation of security reports. This
study also identifies seven resolution actions that security professionals undertake when attempting
to resolve the tensions. These actions are denying responsibility, attempting to change the
organization, self-protection, self-education, repressing the tension, forming tight subgroups, and
withdrawing from the tension.
By understanding the unethical behaviors and their underlying motivations, this study has
increased the body of knowledge toward improving information security compliance. Information
security professionals are privileged insiders who engage in roles and responsibilities that put them
in a position to cause more harm to an organization than non-security insiders. Policies and
regulations continue to be created based on attribution theory. However, as this study underscores,
these policies and regulations are being ignored as information security professionals are being
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forced to resolve the paradoxical tensions between the rules and regulations and their leadership’s
immediate demands that contradict or violate these rules and regulations. This situation becomes
even more pronounced as security professionals gain experience in their career and begin to move
into leadership roles as the more extreme forms of coercion arise. This inference leads us to our
second contribution to theory.
Insider Deviant Behavior Under Duress
As this study indicates, information security professionals encounter different levels of coercion
as they progress through their career. This experience is normally demonstrated as a minor form
of coercion, which is easy to resolve; an example involves stakeholders trying to use coercive
rhetoric to convince a security professional to make changes to a security report. The more
experienced security professionals who have moved into leadership roles undergo more extreme
forms of coercion from their senior leaders, which almost always involve some threat that is
intended to put them under duress. This approach is in contrast to Minor’s “defense of necessity,”
which can include situations such as a security professional claiming that he was not given
sufficient time to complete his report, thus necessitating his generation and submission of an
incomplete report. Defense of necessity does require the use of a threat, and this aspect is the
defining difference between the defense of necessity and malicious behavior under duress. Two
elements are always present when a malicious act is committed under duress. First, a threat is made
and is most often directed toward others, but it can be made directly at the security professional.
Second, the threat is not internal, but rather is always external, signifying that the security
professional is not simply assuming that a threat exists. This threat typically comes from external
sources such as senior leaders. When confronted with a threat that is being directed toward others,
security professionals are less likely to choose to follow the rules or regulations. The reason is that
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they determine the threat to be more likely to occur than the organization is to be caught violating
a rule or a regulation. Additionally, security professionals recognize the threat as having a greater
impact on the lives of those who are being threatened than a potential fine to the organization will
have. By understanding that security professionals confront this type of dilemma, we begin to
understand how attribution theory may not be the best tool for designing policies and regulations
that are meant to deter this type of deviant behavior. This study has provided evidence to support
this assertion, as the experiences of the information security professionals demonstrate.
V.6

Limitations and Future Research

Limitations
This study used both literal and theoretical replications to generate a diverse population.
However, all the participants lived in or had recently relocated from the Southeastern United
States. As such, the participants’ experiences may not be representative of the ones that
information security professionals have in other parts of the country or in other parts of the world,
as the difference in cultures may have an impact on how individuals perceive the world they live
in and the tensions they experience. Additionally, this research focused on one area of the
information security field, security reporting, which did not represent the entire population of
information security roles. Other information security roles may possibly have different
experiences that are different from the ones depicted by the participants.
This study included eight participants. Although using a literal replication ensured that all
of them were from the same field and were expected to have similar experiences, this limited
sample size may not represent a complete picture of the experiences of a larger number of
information security professionals. Additionally, this study did not find evidence to support a
difference in experiences between male and female information security professionals as it affects
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information security reporting, but the study did find that females often experienced gender bias
and pay inequality. No evidence was provided to suggest that these factors had an effect on the
participants’ security report behaviors. Nonetheless, increasing the sample size or recreating the
study using a different group may provide diverse results.
Future Research
This study answered a call for additional research into behavioral information security,
namely, to improve information security compliance and the separation of insider deviant behavior
from insider misbehavior. In answering this call, the author conceptualized a new category of
neutralization technique, the malicious behavior under duress, and outlined two characteristics of
its existence that define its separation from the “defense of necessity.” Further research into
information security professionals who have experienced being placed under duress conditions to
force their compliance with the unethical demands of their leadership would be beneficial to the
behavioral information security field. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first
work to focus on the behaviors of information security professionals as they engage in information
security reporting. Further research into these professionals may help to illuminate the additional
drivers of tensions that they experience, which result in paradoxical tensions. Furthermore, security
reporting is only one aspect of information security; although it covers a broad range of potential
security roles, it does not encompass the entire range of roles in the information security field.
Expanding this research to include other information security roles may be beneficial to understand
if the experiences from this study are similar to the ones experienced by those in other security
roles.
The size of an organization and the different levels of management within an organization
were not a focus of this research, and these factors may have had an impact on the results. The
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larger an organization, the more likely it is to have multiple levels of leadership above the
individual information security professional. This study included participants from small
organizations with 25 or fewer employees and large organizations with over 10,000 employees;
however, this aspect was not tracked in the study. The size of the organization apparently lacked
an impact on the results; nonetheless, a study using organizational size as a variable may determine
if organizational size has an influence on the drivers of tensions or the behaviors of information
security professionals as they engage in security reporting.
The second area addressed in this research was information security compliance; the results
implied that information security professionals who are responsible for protecting their
organizations often engage in the same unethical behavior that they are tasked with defending
against. Although this study focused on information security reporting, further research into other
security roles would serve to highlight the unethical behaviors that other security roles may be
engaging in. In addition to other security roles, improving the understanding of how different
regions and cultures from around the world are experiencing these unethical practices would
increase the body of knowledge, thereby allowing management to develop better compliance
requirements and analytics to detect these unethical practices and discover unethical security
cultures that may be hidden from the executive leadership.
Further research into the impact of professional certifications on ethical behavior is
important to understand the level of consequence to the individuals that may prevent or reduce the
occurrences of violating their ethical or conduct requirements. The issue of whether a professional
certification reduces the likelihood of individuals from engaging in unethical behaviors that are
demanded of them by their leadership also merits an investigation. Gaining an enhanced
understanding of these points can help to improve the deterrence language used by professional
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organizations offering professional certifications to encourage compliance. Another area of
interest for organizations is the identification of specific professional certifications that may
increase ethical behavior. Such approach would assist an organization in determining the
professional certifications that are most important to them when recruiting security talent or
promoting talent within the organization into supervisory positions that may create a more ethical
security culture.
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APPENDICES
Table 2: Paradoxical Perspective in Information Security Reporting

Concepts

Definitions and Claims

Information
security
professionals
as potential
insider threats

Information security professionals must deal
with many of the same competing tensions that
lead to insider deviant behavior. In addressing
these tensions, the perceptions generated
induce the motivations and behaviors that may
evolve into insider threats to an organization.

Paradoxical
tensions

Crossler et al., 2013
Elifoglu et al., 2018

Information security reporting involves
inherent tensions between complying with
organizational security policy requirements and
competing demands such as opposing
Lewis, 2000
management directives or orders to act in a
deviant manner.
Putnam at al., 2016
Information security professionals may be
coerced or threatened into committing deviant
acts, forcing them to encounter the salient
tension of complying or violating security
policy.

Individual
responses

References

When information security professionals
experience paradoxical tensions, they may
engage in choosing one tension over the other
(splitting), move to include a third party such
as human resources (projecting), mentally
repress their role in the act (regression), or
physically remove themselves from the tension
by seeking other employment (withdrawal).

An information security professional will act in
a deviant manner when under duress, such as
when an external actor uses force, fear, or
Insider deviant
coercion to force compliance.
behavior
under duress
While under duress, the security professionals’
perceived ability to act against this duress will
be gauged by their perceived level of fault
responsibility and time urgency.

Lewis and Smith, 2014

Lewis, 2000
Tracy, 2000

Park et al., 2008
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Duress

An affirmative defense for information security
professionals who engage in behavior that
would be considered deviant but are coerced to
do so by the use of force or the threat of force
against themselves or against another;
furthermore, these security professionals, being
of reasonable firmness in their situation, would
be unable to resist this coercion.

Brink, 2018
Fletcher, 1998
Model Penal Code, Sec.
2.09(1)
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